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THESIS

A STRATEGIC-MILITARY ANALYSIS OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

by

Askold I. Kobasa

December, 1995

Thesis Advisor:

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**A STRATEGIC-MILITARY ANALYSIS OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a strategic net assessment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and analyzes its present capability and desire to fight for its newly proclaimed state. It evaluates the military doctrine of Ukraine, the force structure and levels of its military, the various strategic and operational factors affecting the force, and the effects of the "ethnic security map" created by the former Soviet Union on the present-day Ukrainian military. Finally, it assesses four major components of military capability - force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

The findings of this study are that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can sustain short-term combat operations, but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential is there for the Ukrainian military to develop fighting capability to deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military power. It can defend its western borders and for the near term, provides a credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from Russia. This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other components of military capability are brought up to projected levels.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first post-Soviet Ukrainian government moved quickly to rationalize and reform the military forces which it seized from the former Soviet Union. This enthusiasm for reform was motivated by several considerations. First, establishing an independent Ukrainian army was essential in order to create a Ukrainian state. The creation of a military has allowed Ukraine to survive as a new independent political actor. Secondly, Ukraine was faced with a great danger posed by the gigantic arm of the Soviet army on its soil. By establishing a Ukrainian army (initially 750,000 personnel), these personnel were effectively integrated into a stable military structure and their disruptive potential was neutralized, when the link joining the Soviet Union to the military forces in Ukraine was severed and when a Ukrainian military chain of command was established. From 1990-1992 the Soviet military's hierarchy of obedience disintegrated in Ukraine and a new Ukrainian one took its place.

The military doctrine of Ukraine emphasizes the fundamental law of "reasonable defense sufficiency" in regulating the size and types of forces and the quantity and quality of conventional weapons and systems. This doctrine is defensive in nature, based on the principles of nonintervention, respect for the integrity of national borders, and national independence of other states, and rejects the idea of using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the doctrine depicts the democratic values of Ukraine, it does not reflect the existing realities of the developing world and the European situation.

As a result, many Ukrainian policy makers and military leaders do not take the doctrine seriously. Due to these problems, the doctrine does not allow policy makers to determine the main directions of Ukrainian military policy. This in turn makes it difficult for Ukraine to create stable and legal relations with other countries.

Based on the CFE ceilings and Ukrainian defense requirements, since independence, troop numbers have been reduced by at least 200,000. Currently, manpower stands at an estimated 450,000, although the defense doctrine sets a final target of 250,000, with an eventual aim to create a professional armed services. This process will take some time.

To meet its political commitment to a non-nuclear status, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have been participating in an accelerated transfer of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal. Progress has been immense in this area and as a result, Ukraine has gained support from Western states which favor this progress. Simultaneously, Ukraine has been attempting to develop a strategic defense concept against its most likely enemy - Russia. Although progress in this area has been slow, defense concepts are presently being addressed by the Parliament and Ministry of Defense. Another change which has been taking place in the UAF, which will possibly be of greater significance in the long term, is the restructuring and reform of the former Soviet military education system. At this time all the former Soviet military schools have been reformed, in many cases combining to form one institution; in some cases schools have been abolished altogether. These schools have introduced a number of novel

concepts designed to bring the military education in Ukraine into the twenty-first century.

One of the more important problems affecting the UAF is the inherited "ethnic security map" of the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF). It has affected the present day Ukrainian military by creating an ethnic imbalance within the armed forces, thereby posing an important question as to whether or not the Ukrainian forces are loyal to their newly proclaimed state. Although the UAF have inherited the "ethnic security map" of the former Soviet Union, they have made some progress in reversing its effects. Ukraine has successfully waged a re-education campaign to educate the officer corps and its troops through various programs that would make them better "Ukrainian" soldiers. Although additional work is still required to make the UAF more patriotic, the officers and troops are generally loyal to the Ukrainian state and its people.

The findings of this research is that the UAF can sustain short-term combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential is there for the Ukrainian army to develop fighting capability to deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military power. It can defend its western borders and, for the near term, provide a credible deterrence against a potential external threat from Russia. This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other components of military capability - force structure, readiness, and modernization - are brought to projected levels.

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a strategic net assessment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and to analyze its present capability and desire to fight for its newly proclaimed state. The key question addressed is: "Are the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) a credible deterrent to incursions of neighbors?" Other questions that are used to aid in answering the key puzzle include:

- What is the state of the Ukrainian military and is it capable of defending its own territory?
- Does the military force structure and levels support the Ukrainian national security strategy ?
- How do strategic factors, such as nuclear assets, the defense strategic concept, and the military education system influence the UAF ?
- Are sociological issues (crime, ethnic dilemmas...etc.) breaking down the military's ability to defend Ukraine ?

With the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, 15 new states rose as independent entities, radically changing in structure and character the political map of Eurasia. Ukraine's independence has marked the end of an empire in the region, since it has blocked Russian imperialistic desires over the remainder of Europe. Ukraine was the only state which seized a large, as well as the best, part of the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF). This assured independence for the first four years. The current dilemma is that many Russians still believe that Ukraine belongs to Russia. Russia sees the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a road to integrating Ukraine into a Union, which it needs for

economic prosperity. If Ukraine survives, there will be no superpower in Eurasia, however, if it falls, a new imperial Russian state may arise. To avoid the rise of a potential super power, it is therefore crucial that Ukraine succeed. Ukraine's military is essential to its survival, and subsequently requires careful analysis.

Ukraine, a country of 52 million, approximately the size of France and rich in natural resources, is bound to play a key role in the new geopolitical structural arrangement in Eastern and Central Europe. "Ukraine is no longer portrayed as a "buffer" between Eurasia and Europe but as a "bridge" linking both halves of the European continent. Relations with the West have radically improved as Ukraine has launched its first serious reform programme and committed itself to denuclearization" [Ref. 1]. Since 1994-95, Ukraine's approach to foreign policy has altered, becoming more mature and professional, while relations have improved remarkably with the West and to a lesser extent with Russia. The main stumbling blocks to Western support for Ukraine were always the lack of reform under former President Leonid Kravchuk and the denuclearization issue. With the introduction of radical political economic reforms under Kuchma, Ukraine has received financial and technical support from international financial institutions and Western governments. In the realm of security proposals there have also been major advances since 1994-95. Ukraine has agreed to abandon its nuclear arsenal and in exchange received security assurances from three nuclear powers, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia. These are not guarantees despite the fact that Ukrainian

leaders continue to describe them as "security assurances." The "security assurances" support Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence, while opposing external interference in its affairs including the exertion of economic pressure. Western governments have also publicly reiterated in diplomatic meetings, letters of exchange and during press conferences, support for Ukrainian independence and opposition to any changes in its borders. "Since 1994-95 there has been a perceptible change in the United States', and to a lesser extent Western European, understanding of Ukraine's strategic significance. The Republican victory in the 1994 US Congress local elections has reinforced the perception that Ukraine is a strategic ally, important for the West." [Ref. 2]

Ukraine has contributed immensely to the transformation of the geopolitical map of Eurasia. As the Soviet Union disintegrated politically and militarily its armed forces were left virtually intact on the territory of the previously conquered republics, facing the once largest enemy in the west - NATO. Many of the assets that Russia was heir to, roughly 50 percent, were outside the territorial borders of the Russian Republic. While Russia controlled second-rate forces of the Central Strategic Reserve, Ukraine aggressively gained control over first-rate force packages that were part of the second echelon front. According to Russia's defense minister, Army General Pavel Grachev, the forces of the Central Strategic Reserve inherited by Russia, compared to those gained by Ukraine were described as follows:

We received districts, divisions, units and subunits that were strategically secondary or even in the districts, that should war break out, would have been busy mobilizing and training people...These were virtually all noncombat units..understaffed...and lacking in appropriate equipment; all our best gear was on the first strategic defense line, in the Western and Northern Groups of Forces and those districts in.....Ukraine. [Ref. 3]

In light of the actual forces present in the Russian republic and their reserve nature, and compared to the forces that Ukraine inherited, it would seem that Ukraine is in a window of relative superiority. A senior officer of the Moscow General Staff stated that the forces in Ukraine could "easily defeat the whole of Russia in a matter of days" [Ref. 4]. Whether or not this is actually possible is of little consequence as the perception would be enough to prevent any conventional offensive military action against Ukraine.

After Ukraine "nationalized" all former Soviet forces (with the exception of strategic forces) stationed on their territory they claimed over 750,000 men of ground, air and air defense forces (this number swelling up to one million after troops from service in other republics returned). Impelled in part by a newly acquired sense of national (or regional) patriotism and socio-economic considerations, most troops agreed to remain in Ukraine. Subsequently, a great majority of troops swore allegiance to the newly formed Ukrainian independent state. [Ref. 5]

As a rule, military institutions of most rising states have a tendency to resemble those of highly developed ones. Ukraine is no exception and has inherited military traditions, institutions and organization from its former

imperial "mother country." Since Ukraine gained control from the former Soviet Union a simultaneously large, diversified, but modern and well-equipped force contingent, the process of building Ukraine's armed forces has been one of reform rather than one of starting anew. [Ref. 6]

This thesis is divided into four major parts and employs a structural approach, shown in Figure 1. Part One: The Seeds of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, consists of two chapters. Chapter II, The Beginning and the Legal Basis for National Security, discusses the seeds for the Ukrainian national armed forces which were planted one year and a half before Ukraine proclaimed its independence. It shows the idea of a Ukrainian national army together with the goal of an independent state, which surfaced mainly as a grass-roots movement (*Rukh*), and which was evident in the Union of Ukrainian officers (UOU). This chapter also discusses how the new Ukrainian Parliament in 1990-1991 legislated in establishing an armed forces after August 1991, and the take over of all conventional armed forces located on the territory of Ukraine.

Chapter III, Military Doctrine of Ukraine, describes the doctrinal framework of the 14 October 1993 pronouncement of Ukrainian national security interests and policy which defined the main tenets on preventing war, building of the armed forces and preparation of the state and the armed forces in repelling aggression in a military-political situation. Attention is given to the key features of the doctrine, stressing its defensive nature, its principles of nonintervention, respect for the integrity of national borders and national

independence of other states, and the rejection of the concept of using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy.

Part Two, The Resources and Direction of the UAF consists of two chapters. Chapter IV, Force Structure and Levels, discusses the UAF reorganization to meet the principle of "reasonable defense sufficiency" and the ceilings established by the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), in 1992. Such reorganization affected the restructuring of the military districts and the three service branches (Army, Air Forces and Navy). In the face of economic difficulty, the most recent debate of 1995 over further military force structure cuts, which are likely to be lower than the initially established ceilings, is also discussed.

Chapter V, Strategic/Operational Factors Influencing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, assesses the nuclear assets on Ukrainian territory; lays out Ukraine's three options for a defense strategy focusing on the potential threat from the east; and describes the military education system, which will influence and frame how Ukrainian officers act and think in the future.

Part Three, Organizational Interaction in the UAF, consists of two chapters. Chapter VI, Ethnic Security Map, describes the complex ethnic situation in Ukraine while it was under Soviet rule and shows how the established "ethnic security map" has affected present day Ukraine and its military, by creating ethnic imbalance within the armed forces. Content focuses on the theoretical aspects of the ethnic issue, by using the works of N.F. Dreiszinger, R.A. Preston, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone.

Chapter VII, Sociological Issues, covers a host of sociological issues that plague the Ukrainian military leadership, affecting troop morale, discipline, readiness and combat sustainability. The salient problems addressed include: force conversion and quality of life, language in command, the re-education program, military traditions and customs and civil-military relations.

Part Four, Military Capability of Ukrainian Forces, concludes the analysis by applying four major components of military capability - force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability - to the UAF as a frame of reference. By employing the data from Parts One, Two and Three, and applying it to the four components of military capability, I conclude that although the UAF currently possess high force levels it is a rather weak and an unsustainable force. Even though, this force is presently unsustainable, it does have the stinging capability to slowly and methodically destroy any external force that desires to interfere in Ukraine's sovereignty.




Figure 1. Structural Analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces UAF

II. THE BEGINNING AND THE LEGAL BASIS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Ukraine's endeavors to gain command of the military forces located within its boundaries may be traced to four prominent events:

1. Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty
2. The August 1991 coup attempt
3. The appointment of defense minister of Ukraine, and
4. The Ukrainian military oath campaign [Ref. 7]

In this chapter, Samuel Huntington's paradigm - the hierarchy of obedience [Ref. 8] - demonstrates how command over and within a professional army is affirmed. By employing this model to our analysis, we can infer that in order to gain control over the military forces in Ukraine two tasks needed to be accomplished:

1. Destabilization of the military hierarchy of obedience in Ukraine at the crucial point of subordination. The link joining the Soviet Union to the military forces in Ukraine had to be severed. Furthermore - within the military's legal body structure - the bond tying the officers located in Ukraine to the remainder of the Soviet officer corps needed to be cut along with the one linking the organizational bureaucracy of the military forces in Ukraine to the organizational bureaucracy of the Soviet military structure.
2. Establishment of a Ukrainian military hierarchy of obedience with the Ukrainian state at the peak of this hierarchy, while promoting the transition of the Soviet officer corps situated in Ukraine into a Ukrainian officer corps. This, in turn, would create and maintain the Ukrainian military's bureaucratic structure.

Therefore, Huntington's paradigm best depicts how the Soviet military's hierarchy of obedience was disintegrated in Ukraine and how a new Ukrainian one was constructed to take its place.

The seeds for the Ukrainian national armed forces were planted long before Ukraine proclaimed its independence. As the power of Moscow declined during 1989-1991, hopes for an independent state with the idea of a Ukrainian national army, emerged at grass-roots. This occurred primarily out of the Ukrainian Popular Front "*Rukh*" and was soon joined by the newly established Association of Ukrainian Officers, a powerful advocacy group whose members included active duty, reserve and retired officers. [Ref. 9]

Ukrainian leaders knew that the number one priority in making Ukraine a viable independent state was to put as much distance between them and Russia as quickly as possible. The historic attitudes toward Ukrainians and an intimate knowledge of Russian imperialism made the cause for defense against Russian chauvinism an initial unifying principal in the drive for independence. The establishment of an Armed Forces was a significant instrument for success in this policy pursuit. The idea of a sovereign nation met wide popular support and became a demand of every national front; many in Ukraine believed that the formation of the Ukrainian national armed forces would aid in remodeling "the sick man of Soviet society" - the Soviet army. Ukrainian separatists became obsessed with creating their own army, as a requirement to establishing a sovereign state. The historical memories of the disaster of 1918-1920 were a constant reminder to many Ukrainian political and military leaders

who remembered how, in 1917-1918, the idealistic and antimilitaristic socialists controlled the Central *Rada* (parliament) and dissolved veteran formations loyal to them. The future of the newborn Ukrainian state was left in the hands of undermanned and poorly equipped volunteer units. In less than two years the Ukrainian Republic, defeated by the Red Army, ceased to exist. The new Ukrainian political leadership in 1990-1991 learned from this grave error of the past and was determined not to repeat it. This sense of urgency was greatly elevated during the *putsch* days of August 1991, when the Ukrainian government realized it had no army to defend itself with and that it was entirely subject to events in Moscow. [Ref. 10]

There was also a strong popular pressure for Ukrainians to create their own army after revelations showed the abuse of soldiers in the Soviet army which resulted in thousands of deaths and serious injuries yearly. Mothers began refusing to send their sons as enforcers of "order" in hot spots on the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and Ukrainian parents began to demand not only humane treatment of their sons but also that they serve within Ukraine [Ref. 11]. Beginning with the formation of local committees in the fall of 1989, concerned mothers, from many regions of Ukraine, formed a national advocacy group, "The Organization of Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine" (OSMU), on 30 September, 1990. Its key objectives were to bear down on the Soviet military establishment in order to improve the treatment and well being of new recruits in the Soviet army, to insist that all Ukrainian recruits serve only within the

territory of the Ukrainian SSR and to push for the formation of a separate national Ukrainian armed forces.

These grass-roots movements, to a large extent, attained their objectives on 16 July 1990, when the Ukrainian parliament (Supreme *Rada* or Council) proclaimed national sovereignty for Ukraine and declared that "the Ukrainian SSR has the right to its own armed forces" [Ref. 12]. This provided a rallying banner for national army advocates and spurred a mandate for national defense legislation the following year.

A. CRITICAL EVENTS: FORMATION OF AN ARMED FORCES

By mid-February 1992, Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov stated that approximately 80 percent of the military forces located in Ukraine had vowed allegiance to the citizens of the country. At the time, Ukraine's newly chosen president was in command of the second largest army in Europe and accountable for the world's third largest reserve of nuclear arms. The possibility of a military coup as occurred in Moscow in August 1991, had virtually been eliminated.

To have a total understanding of the UAF, it is first important to analyze its formation process. This process is described through an analysis of four prominent events.

1. The Declaration of Sovereignty

Although the Declaration of Sovereignty of 16 July 1990, recognized Ukraine's authority to have its own armed forces, the legal origin of the Ukrainian armed forces dates from 24 August 1991, when Ukraine declared its complete independence from the former Soviet Union, two days after the collapse of the *putsch* in Moscow. Paragraph IX of Ukraine's Declaration of State Sovereignty (Appendix A - Abstract from Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty) included the following conditions pertaining to the military:

- A. The Ukrainian SSR possesses the right to build its own armed forces;
- B. The Ukrainian SSR decides the requirements of military service for citizens of the republic;
- C. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR complete their military service obligations on the territory of the republic and will not be deployed, in a military capacity, outside of its borders without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR; and
- D. The Ukrainian SSR emphatically states its determination to become, in the future, a permanently neutral state which does not participate in military alliances and one which will adhere to the three non-nuclear principles - not to accept, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. [Ref. 13]

It is crucial to note that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet made no major endeavors to acquire command of their forces until after the August 1991 *putsch*. Between July 1990 and August 1991 only, the popular front 'Rukh' agitated its desire to create an armed force. In February, 1991, it hosted a conference for the Revival of Ukraine's Armed Forces and devised an outline to establish a professional, all-volunteer force. In July 1991, *Rukh* sponsored

a military congress in which over 300 Soviet officers participated. The Ukrainian Officer's Association was established at this congress and plans to form a Ukrainian army were adopted [Ref. 14]. These activities laid the groundwork for the organization of an independent Ukrainian military which officially began to form after the August coup.

2. The August Coup

The unsuccessful coup of August 1991 launched a sequence of events that ultimately led to the ruin of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the demise of the Union itself, and the disintegration of the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF). On the eve of the August coup, the military's corporate structure was already breaking down. Within the military's professional and organizational hierarchies, three fissures began to develop:

1. The senior military had become politicized by internal opposition to a centrally-controlled Union and military;
2. The junior officers had become politicized by the fragmenting state of their already inferior living and working conditions and by the senior military leadership's lack of attention to their predicament; and
3. Draftees began to be affected by the political movement for autonomy and independence.

This fractionalization affected the military in three ways:

1. A number of politicizing forces severed the military ranks, separating the officer corps along generational lines;

2. Troops were deprived of a sense of institutional attachment with the armed forces or the Soviet state they were supposedly defending; and
3. Military professionalism, formed over decades, was being dissolved. [Ref. 15]

Defense Minister Marshal D. N. Yazov's command, which activated the armed forces in support of the *putsch*, further atomized the army by challenging the officer corps' professionalism. Additionally, the *putsch* fractured the corporateness of the Soviet armed forces into cross-cutting groups of those who strongly backed the coup, those who actively countered it, and the diverse opinions and postures in between. After the failed *putsch*, the Soviet military became particularly vulnerable to Ukrainian nationalization goals. As a result, the first solid steps in establishing the basis for the UAF were taken following the abortive coup attempt of August 19-21, 1991. On 24 August 1991, the day that Ukraine declared independence, the parliamentary opposition stressed Ukraine's powerless situation during the coup, and suggested that a special session of parliament examine the issue of the creation of a national army and the nationalization of all military enterprises in Ukraine. The chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, on 24 August 1991 determined:

- A. To subordinate all military structures deployed on the republic's territory to the USSR Supreme Soviet;
- B. To create a Ukrainian defense ministry; and

- C. To form a Ukrainian armed forces, a republican guard, and a subdetachment in order to protect the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Cabinet of Ministers, and National Bank. [Ref. 16]

3. The Appointment of a Defense Minister of Ukraine and the Structuring of Forces

Following the coup, Ukraine's relations with Russia quickly declined due to statements made by Yeltsin, on Russia's claim to reconsider its boundaries with neighboring republics which had proclaimed their independence. As a result, Kravchuk, reacting to outside tensions as well as rising domestic demands to sustain Ukraine's independence, stated that Ukraine would shortly create a republican defense minister. Also, a special commission was created in order to intentionally point out to the USSR Defense Ministry the subordination of troops of the three military districts on Ukrainian soil to Ukraine. On August 29, the presidium of the Ukrainian parliament ratified decrees, which transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, the border troops, interior troops, and military commissariats located on Ukrainian territory. Lastly, on 3 September 1991, after an extended session, the Ukrainian parliament designated Konstantin Morozov, a Soviet Major General of Aviation, as the Defense Minister.

After Morozov's appointment, the Presidium of the Ukrainian parliament prohibited the redeployment of all military bodies and educational establishments on the republic's territory or over its borders. Additionally, it

prohibited the sending of military hardware from Ukraine without prior sanctioning from the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

In six weeks, Morozov finished a draft proposal for the establishment of the Ukrainian military, calling for the formation of a Ukrainian army via a mediated transfer of Soviet troops and provisions to Ukraine [Ref. 17]. On 8 October 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers decreed to institute a Ukrainian National Army in the course of two years, with a temporary force of 450,000 troops. This figure was composed by taking an assumed European average of 0.8 percent of the population for the size of a sufficient armed forces [Ref. 18].

Such acts were harshly criticized by the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) leadership. In October 1991, the Ukrainian parliament endorsed a packet of draft laws on national defense which ordered the establishment of the armed forces and national guard of Ukraine.

This initiated a swift series of laws applied within the next coming months that laid the legal groundwork for the beginning of the Ukrainian national security structure and the formation and organization of the national armed forces of Ukraine. On 11 October 1991, the "Concept for the Defense and the Formation of Armed Forces of Ukraine," put into action by open declaration, implemented the rationale for the organization of the armed forces; to include ground, air and naval powers.

Under the declaration, those strategic forces associated to the operation and defense of nuclear weapons and systems situated on the territory of Ukraine were to continue their operational subordination to central command

in Moscow until the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine was achieved.

This idea permitted for the establishment of paramilitary organizations such as the national guard, border and civil defense troops. On 4 November, a National Guard was established and its commander named as Colonel V. Kukharets [Ref. 19]. The first units were 6,000-strong and drawn from MVD troops already stationed in Ukraine. A force of 30,000 was envisioned by April 1992, to be armed with requisitioned MVD equipment [Ref. 20].

After the Supreme Soviet took control of all border guards stationed in Ukraine on 23 October 1991, the Law on State Frontiers on 4 November gave them something to police. The guards, under command of V. Hubenko, were to patrol Ukraine's land, sea, air, river, and economic frontiers, together with 12 miles of territorial waters. [Ref. 21]

Overall, the "Concept for the Defense and the Formation of Armed Forces of Ukraine," designated the president, as the supreme commander of the armed forces, delegating to him a wide range of powers, including the right to declare a state of emergency or war, to call for a partial or full mobilization of the military establishment and to appoint and supervise its key leaders.

At first, the Soviet General Staff scorned this attempt to create a Ukrainian military. However, by early November, the Soviet and Ukrainian defense ministries were forced to acknowledge it, and met at the bargaining table to discuss the division of the Soviet Army [Ref. 22]. Shortly afterward, a concept was developed by Morozov which led to the creation of a national

security structure: a Ministry of Defense and Defense Council was organized on 14 November 1991, and the Main Staff of the Armed Forces was composed in spring 1992. It also proposed the progressive diminishment of the forces found in Ukraine and the promise of social protection for military personnel released from active service [Ref. 23].

By agreeing to meet Morozov, the Soviet military acknowledged Ukraine's right to establish an army. Once the Soviet Army acknowledged the Ukrainian Defense Minister, the conflict broadened significantly. The dispute moved beyond the question of whether Ukraine could have an independent army, to the question of how large and what units would be excluded in its force structure. As time moved on, it was apparent that the Soviet military was losing control of its corporate structure in Ukraine. In a matter of time, most of the UAF fell under Ukraine's control.

4. The Oath of Allegiance

In order to destroy the unity of the SAF in Ukraine and to replace the Ukrainian state as the new sovereign of these forces, General Morozov implemented a military oath of allegiance to the citizens of Ukraine [Ref. 24]. The oath of allegiance, like Ukrainian state-building efforts in other spheres, was "ethnic-blind." There were no ethnic or linguistic criteria associated with swearing allegiance to Ukraine; the only criterion was the willingness to serve the people of Ukraine. Before commencing with the oath, the government launched an informational campaign aimed in deterring the 700,000 Soviet

troops based in Ukraine from taking part in yet another coup. The massive informational campaign was conducted via the mass media and visits of high ranking officials to military bases [Ref. 25]. This was achieved by convincing the troops that the creation of the UAF would be completed via a slow transformation process that would assure the social rights of all Soviet military personnel and their dependents.

On 14 November 1991, the Supreme Council established an oath of allegiance, along with a procedure for enforcement, in order to guarantee the loyalty of the nationalized forces. Among the first to swear allegiance to the people of Ukraine was Defense Minister Morozov (Appendix B - Ukraine's Military Oath of Allegiance) to the people of Ukraine [Ref. 26]. Along with encouraging all military troops based in Ukraine to follow his lead, he also revealed a 16-point presidential order which described the procedures for implementing the Ukrainian oath of allegiance [Ref. 27]. The oath itself was voluntary; nevertheless, an officer declining to take it would be given a choice between serving his military duty outside of Ukraine or retiring. Enlisted personnel were presented with the same options plus the added option of carrying out the remainder of their duty in Ukraine before being sent back to their home republic. It was President Kravchuk's goal that the oath be administered to the entire force by 20 January 1992 [Ref. 28].

Although General Morozov was unable to meet Kravchuk's ultimate target date of 20 January 1992, by mid-February nearly 80 percent of the military personnel stationed in Ukraine had pledged allegiance to the people of

Ukraine [Ref. 29]. Since the oath subordinated those who took it to the Ukrainian command authority, the likelihood of another Moscow implemented military coup became improbable. The oath of allegiance to Ukraine completed the process of separation and helped create a new military corporate body linking it to a new patron - the Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian military oath was civic and territorial rather than ethno-national. This all-embracing ritual joined those who swore it to each other and to the state, even though some swore allegiance for socio-economic and opportunistic reasons, thereby transforming the Soviet forces stationed in Ukraine into a Ukrainian military power [Ref. 30].

In the same period, since Russia was reluctant to institute a new oath, Soviet troops in other republics continued to serve under the old oath to the Soviet Union. By late 1992, Russian troops were serving under three separate oaths to the Soviet Union, the CIS and Russia.

B. INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Ukraine continued to institutionalize its forces and on 6 December 1991, an all-inclusive law "On the Defense of Ukraine" was established which summarized the contents of the Ukrainian defense policy, specified the responsibilities and duties of government branches and officials in the realm of national defense and provided for alternative service. Most importantly perhaps, it also defined presidential decision making with regard to declaration

of national emergency, war and mobilization dependent on confirmation by the Supreme Council. [Ref. 31]

By maintaining control over the military budget and appointment of prominent defense officials, the Supreme Council maintained a civilian control over the military establishment. Although, at that time, the appointed minister of defense and deputies were all military officers rather than civilian officials, this has since changed and, in 1994, Valerij Shmarov became the first civilian defense minister. Subsequently, Kravchuk appointed himself as commander-and-chief of Ukrainian forces in one of his first decrees on 12 December 1991. This announced the organization of the Ukrainian armed forces based on the troops of the three Soviet military regions spanning Ukrainian territory (Kiev, Odessa, Transcarpathian), as well as the Black Sea Fleet and "other military formations" deployed on Ukrainian territory, excluding the strategic forces at the time belonging to the CIS. By the end of December 1991, Morozov would claim that the legal ground for the UAF had been fully developed.

On March 25, 1992, the "Law on General Military Obligation and Military Service" established an 18-month service program; 12 months for university graduates, 3 years for those serving voluntarily as well as for female enlistees, and five years for warrant officers and midshipmen. Other than the rank of "marshal" which was eliminated and the rank of "general of the army of Ukraine" which was introduced, the past structure of the former Soviet armed forces was retained. Additionally, other legal acts arranged for the organization of a military intelligence service, military justice, defense conversion program,

system for social defense of service members, program for optional (nonmilitary) service, field service regulations, mobilization and other defense-related arenas [Ref. 32]. The technical, organizational, and personnel bases of the armed forces were to be established in 1992, and the entire procedure of structuring the UAF was to be completed by 1994-1995 [Ref. 33].

Ukraine continually sought the control of the forces on its territory on the basis of rightful "inheritance," although this inevitably led to difficulties with Russia. Ukraine's "right" to develop an armed force was disputed by Russians who set a broad definition on the idea of CIS regulation of "strategic forces," and who believed that Russia alone should acquire the USSR armed forces, and who purely disapproved of the idea of Ukraine being a well-armed state.

The one major exception to Ukraine's ambition in building a military strong state was nuclear armies. The 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe led Ukrainian public opinion to be deeply anti-nuclear. This feeling was cast in the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, which guaranteed Ukraine "not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons." This was further reasserted by a declaration of Ukraine's non-nuclear status on 24 October 1991. Ultimately, Ukraine vowed to remove all tactical nuclear weapons for destruction by the summer of 1992, and all strategic weapons by year end, 1994. [Ref. 34] In reality, the timeline has shifted, and it is now anticipated that Ukraine will be "nuclear free" later than originally thought. Although, Ukraine has recognized that it surrendered a very potent bargaining chip when it gave up its nuclear capability, by the same act, it has picked up a sizable

amount of credibility from Western countries for striving to become a more democratic state. The non-nuclear status that Ukraine vowed to support is reciprocated by the funding that Ukraine is receiving from the West.

Ukraine's Defense Ministry is currently in the midst of planning the total reform of the former Soviet military forces they have 'inherited.' Among the many issues that must be resolved are: a 50 percent reduction-in-forces, a realignment of the military education system, the development of a concrete strategic defense plan, the military's adoption of the Ukrainian language, the restructuring of the "ethnic security map," and a transition to a professional all-volunteer military. Clearly, the Ukrainian military reform is far from being totally "complete."

III. THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF UKRAINE

Following the overwhelming endorsement received in the referendum of December 1991 (about 90 percent of the 84 percent that voted), Ukraine formally became independent on 1 December 1991. The first priority of the former communist, turned nationalist, government was to ensure that this move would be irreversible. Naturally, in the process of state building, the creation of Ukrainian national Armed Forces became crucial in Kiev's plans. The Ministry of defense produced a draft military doctrine for the newly independent state early in 1992. This draft was however, rejected by the Parliament in October 1992 and again in April 1993. The sticking point, apparently, was the declared policy on nuclear weapons. It was not until 19 October that a revised draft was enacted into law.

Section A of this chapter, describes the overall setting in which Ukraine is presently situated. Section B summarizes the ratified version of the military doctrine, while Section C provides comments and analysis of this document.

A. UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY AND SETTING

During the Kravchuk era, Ukraine rejoined an international community of nations that did not always seem eager to accept the disintegration of the former USSR into fifteen newly independent states. The election of Leonid Kuchma as president in summer 1994 brought few radical geostrategic changes in Ukraine's foreign and security policies and certainly no major alternations

in its geopolitical orientation. Nevertheless, there have been noticeable changes in style and substance between Kravchuk and Kuchma. Ukraine is no longer portrayed as a "buffer" between Eurasia and Europe but as a "bridge" linking both halves of the European continent. [Ref. 35]

Initially Ukrainian foreign policy was based on the assumption that Ukraine, unlike Russia, was a typical "European" (rather than "Eurasian") state. This meant that the new state's geopolitical orientation would automatically be to the West rather than eastward to Russia. The first and most obvious implication of this policy was that Ukraine should develop friendly relations with its immediate western neighbors in central and southeastern Europe, Ukraine's "doorway to the West." In the development of bilateral (instead of multilateral) relations with its immediate western neighbors Ukraine was largely successful. Although the east-central and south-eastern Europeans were themselves looking primarily westward, they nevertheless appreciated the importance of securing their eastern borders and were therefore keen to reinforce Ukrainian independence and to cement good relations with the new state.

Where the policy of "returning to Europe" broke down was in its implications for the relationship with Russia and the states of the traditional West. Here, the policy backfired badly, for it reinforced Ukraine's alienation from Russia and thus increased tensions. Under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine has drastically altered foreign policy. Kiev's foreign policy is no longer seen as a "zero sum game" (*i.e.*, either integration with the West

and sovereign independence or reabsorption by Russia and loss of sovereignty). Instead, slightly closer relations with Russia are being balanced by improved relations with the West. The policy of balancing Russia and the West is hazardous and not entirely under Ukraine's control, however, given present constraints, it is difficult to identify constructive alternatives. [Ref. 36]

President Kuchma has changed Ukraine's foreign policy in a number of key directions. Ukraine no longer looks upon economic cooperation with Russia and the CIS as an unfortunate necessity, but as an urgent requirement in the light of the close economic ties inherited from the former USSR and its economic crisis. Political and military integration within the CIS continues to be ruled out by Ukraine, although bilateral cooperation, for example between the military-industrial complexes of Russia and Ukraine, is regarded as beneficial. Ukraine is, however, interested in raising its profile in the CIS by helping to mediate in local conflicts such as Moldova and Georgia. [Ref. 37]

The underlying structure of this section deals with the fear of Russia. Because of this fear, Ukraine puts forwards no territorial claims on other states and "does not acknowledge territorial claims on itself." It proposes that present borders must remain safe from violation and emphasizes that there must be "mutual respect" and "non-interference in the internal affairs" of other countries. Ukraine also stresses the principles of the UN, CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act. Many people in Russia, especially in the military, do not regard Ukraine with respect and do not treat it as an equal. Even those willing to tolerate an independent Ukraine see no reason why certain areas heavily inhabited by

Russians should be part of the new state. Other largely Russia-supporting areas (the four eastern *oblasts* and, to an extent, Odessa), upheld the independence referendum in 1991 because Ukraine looked like a better option than Russia. However, the present state of Ukraine's economy, might possibly lead them to reconsider their support if given another opportunity to voice their preference. This situation is of grave concern to Kiev, as Russians account for up to 21 percent of the country's population, mostly concentrated in areas adjoining Russia.

The origin of insecurity and potential causes of military conflict clearly relate to the Russian threat. Economic and/or political blackmail are feared. Indeed, many Ukrainian nationalists regard Russia's insistence since January 1994, on charging world prices for oil, as an example of such blackmail. A worsening situation may soon follow. Moscow is accused of being the culprit in stirring up "ethno-national" discontent within Ukraine in order to destabilize the country, providing an excuse for intervention leading to a restoration of greater Russia, or, at minimum, seizing the areas displaying Russian support.

[Ref. 38]

Presently, the biggest concern for the Ukrainian Parliament is that Russia may be attempting to resurrect a Union which would absorb Ukraine into a similar setting found prior to its independence. Furthermore, since portions of Ukraine are constructed from parts of Poland, Hungary, Belarus, Russia and Romania, the issue of territoriality is becoming more disputed. This may best be depicted in the case Romania and Russia, who continue to voice doubts on

the territorial integrity of Ukraine. At the same time, the inability of Russia and Ukraine to sign a treaty because of territorial issues further complicates matters.

B. CONTENT OF UKRAINE'S MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine has three sections and eight subsections. In the first section "Military and Political Aspects" the following subsections are included:

- military and political goals and priorities of Ukraine in ensuring national security;
- causes of military insecurity and Ukraine's attitude to war;
- attitude of Ukraine to nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

In the second section "Military and Technical Aspects" the following subsections are included:

- basic ways to ensure military security;
- tasks of Armed Forces and principles of their construction;
- training Armed Forces for defense against aggression.

In the third section "Military and Economic Aspects" the following subsection are included:

- the purpose and principles of military economic policy;

- preparation of the state and the population to the defense.

Ukraine's strategic defense task is to protect the country's sovereignty and political independence and to preserve its territorial integrity. Having established that this is the fundamental task, the doctrine goes on to point out that the military doctrine is part of a national security concept which also includes political, foreign policy and economic elements, that Ukraine does not constitute a potential enemy for any state, and its military doctrine is therefore defensive, and that "Ukraine can and should become an influential power capable of performing an important role in preserving political, economic and military stability in Europe and throughout the world."

Ukraine's military-political goals and priorities in national security [Ref. 39] are laid down as follows:

- A. The main aim is to ensure military security from external threats and prevent war.
- B. Relations with other states will be based on principles of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the principles espoused by the UN, the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE.
- C. In implementing its foreign and military policies, Ukraine does not advance territorial claims on other states and acknowledges none against itself. It adheres to the principle of the inviolability of existing borders and respects the sovereignty and political independence of other states. It favors regional and global balanced force reductions to levels of defense sufficiency, but rejects unilateral disarmament and insists on solving all inter-state disputes by political means. Furthermore, it prohibits the use of the Armed Forces in dealing with internal political problems and argues against the stationing of foreign troops on its territory or on that of other states without their agreement.

- D. Ukraine will maintain a "non-bloc status", but favors the creation of and participation in "inclusive" European and global security systems. It favors a general European security structure on bilateral, regional and global levels with the aim of improving mutual understanding, trust, partnership and transparency in military-political affairs.

The causes of military insecurity and Ukraine's attitudes to war are summed up as follows:

- A. The main causes of military conflict and war are economic, political, territorial and ethno-national disputes.
- B. Ukraine will regard as potential enemy any state whose policy consistently threatens its military security, interferes in its internal affairs, or aspires to control its territory or infringes its national interests.
- C. Ukraine condemns war or its threat as an instrument of policy and aspires to the resolution of disputes and conflicts by exclusively political means.
- D. The country will not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.
- E. Its Armed Forces will be used only in case of armed aggression or in accordance with international obligations. In the event of war, they will repel the aggressor so that a political solution can be found as quickly as possible. [Ref. 40]

Given the global catastrophic consequence of nuclear war, the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Circumstances have made Ukraine a nuclear power, but the country will never threaten or use nuclear weapons. It intends to become a non-nuclear power in the future and is against the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and related technology. [Ref. 41]

For the military-technical aspects of the Doctrine, the key tasks in ensuring military security are as follows:

- A. In peacetime: forecasting the aim and character of possible war, averting it if possible; creating a military machine sufficient to deter aggression, check provocations or infringements of sovereignty and repulse possible aggression "by any state (or coalition of states); "force levels must be "within the context of international obligations which Ukraine has accepted."
- B. In wartime: mobilizing all material and human resources to repel aggression; defeating the aggressor, depriving him of the ability to prolong hostilities and bringing the war to a favorable conclusion.

Measures that are listed in the doctrine, in order to attain military security, include:

- A. Political-diplomatic efforts to reduce levels of confrontation.
- B. The creation of zones free of weapons of mass destruction.
- C. The creation of regional security systems and collective action to resolve emerging conflicts.
- D. The maintenance of combat readiness and force levels and deployments sufficient to repulse aggression from "all-directions", together with a mass mobilization capability.
- E. The willingness to assign troops to the UN to halt aggression and support peace "in different regions."

The military-technical aspects section of the doctrine stresses that the Armed Forces be prepared and be able to resist aggression. It asserts that priority will go to the development of precision weaponry, reconnaissance capabilities, air-space defense, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, missile

forces and aviation, air-mobile units and "future oriented ocean-going ships and submarines." This section also mentions that the UAF be given a unified system of automated command and control, intelligence gathering and fire control. It states that training will be for both defensive and offensive operations to ensure that the initiative can be seized and retained. Finally, it stated that during war, the Border and Interior Troops, the National Guard, the Security Service and Civil Defense "will work with the Armed Forces." [Ref. 42]

The military-economic section of the Doctrine mentions that the objective of military-economic policy is the creation of a reliable defense capability in the context of reasonable defense expenditure. The principles of military economic policy are as follows:

- A. The guarantee of maximum effectiveness in military production given financial and material constraints. This demands a competitive approach to development and production.
- B. The acquisition of high-technology systems with as much standardization as possible.
- C. The "rational" conversion of defense industries is mentioned.

The military-economic section of the Doctrine further states, that scientific-technical priority must go to developing technologies with both military and civilian applications and to those in which Ukraine has, or can achieve, a global standard. The aim is to raise the fire power and mobility and produce equipment competitive on the world market. Although high-technology is paramount to Ukraine's defense system, it claims that the first call

on financial resources should go to ensuring the material and social well-being of servicemen. [Ref. 43]

C. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT OF UKRAINE'S MILITARY DOCTRINE

Ukraine, like Russia, has been sluggish in developing and accepting a national defense policy, which has been called a "military doctrine." It was not until 19 October 1993, that a very terse and direct revised draft was made into law, formally declaring Ukrainian national security interests and policy. This new doctrine, resulting from the Declaration of Sovereignty of 1990 and the Declaration of Independence of 1991, clearly outlined the main tenets on preventing war, building the armed forces and preparation of the state and the armed forces in repelling aggression in any military-political situation. Its major characteristic was the defensive nature of Ukraine's security policy, based on the principles of nonintervention, respect for the integrity of national borders and national independence of other states, and rejection of the idea of using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. This strongly differs from the newly adopted Russian military doctrine, which foresees Russian military intervention across Russia's borders under certain conditions, such as interference in peripheral conflicts and protection and defense of the rights of Russian minorities in neighboring states (and first strike against any state allied to a nuclear state). This was seen by many analysts especially aimed at Ukraine. [Ref. 44]

The military doctrine "is based on an analysis of the global geopolitical situation and a long-term, scientifically-based prognosis of its development. Its tenets are binding for the organs and organizations of the state, the administration and the citizens of Ukraine. The plan for the building.....of the Armed Forces ... is worked out on the basis of the military doctrine." [Ref. 45] Due to political sensitivity, Ukraine's new doctrine refrains from identifying precisely what the potential threats from neighboring states may actually be. Instead, it only defines the possible opponent of Ukraine as a "state whose consistent policy presents a military threat to Ukraine, leads to interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine or encroaches on its territorial integrity and its national interests." This description leaves little to the imagination as to where the threat could possibly originate.

In order to strengthen the Ukrainian government's previous statutory and political commitment to a non-nuclear status, the doctrine states that "Ukraine intends to become non-nuclear in the future." However, it also positively asserts Ukraine's ownership of nuclear weapons inherited on its territory. The military doctrine emphasizes the fundamental law of "reasonable defense sufficiency" in regulating the size and types of forces and the quantity and quality of conventional weapons and systems. It focuses on developing a modern, well-trained, well-armed and highly mobile force, with a special emphasis on precision weapons, intelligence and electronic warfare capability, air and space defense and sufficient air and sea power. To attain all this, it

calls for the development and maintenance of a modern and economically rational national defense industrial base. [Ref. 46]

The basis for the Military Doctrine was the "Basic Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine," adopted by the Parliament on 2 July 1993. It is stressed by many analysts that the Military Doctrine (Appendix C - The Military Doctrine of Ukraine) as a 'second level' document should be more detailed than it is at present. To fully comprehend the Ukrainian military, it is crucial to analyze three aspects of this doctrine: the military and political, the military and technical, and the military and economical.

1. Military Political Aspects of Doctrine

Presently, one of the key dilemmas in the political-military sphere is that Ukraine itself still has not determined its political priorities. Based on the present political realities, Ukraine has three courses of action it can select to make the Military Doctrine a guide for other countries to build their relations with Ukraine on stable legal basis:

- Non-aligned status of Ukraine (according to the Military Doctrine of Ukraine)
- Joining European structures, and
- Rapprochement with CIS countries and joining the CIS Military Union.

Unfortunately, the statements of Ukrainian politicians force analysts to make a conclusion that they have no common foreign policy concept, although

a document such as the "Basic Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine" already exists (Appendix D - Attitude of Ukrainian Leaders towards the Doctrine). This was evident when the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, said he did not understand non-block statutes of Ukraine, and when the Ukrainian Foreign Minister considered that effective European security could not exist in a divided Europe. In other speeches, Deputy Foreign Minister B. Tarasiuk held the same view, but also estimated that the role of Ukraine in peaceful settlement of international conflicts would be only on the territory of the CSCE. This lack of coordination and synchronization between the political leaders negatively affects the implementation of Ukraine's military doctrine. [Ref. 47]

Although some talks have been conducted between Ukraine and Russia (Appendix E - Ukraine and Russia), Russia continues to delay signing a general political treaty in which it would confirm the territorial integrity and state borders of both countries. In addition, the problem is compounded if one takes into account the unpredictability of the present Government of Russia, as well as its possible successor. This reality clearly depicts how objectionable, and even dangerous, a military union can be with Russia or the CIS if Russia's role would be dominant (Appendix F - Ukraine and the CIS).

The urgency of Ukraine's "non-bloc" status was presumably initially intended to mollify Russian concerns. Reality is that, Ukraine has joined Partnership for Peace (PFP) two years before Russia, and during President Clinton's recent visit to Ukraine, Kuchma has voiced his desire in the extension NATO. Although this is a positive move for Ukraine, it is contrary to what was

initially intended when the military doctrine was written. It seems that the doctrine has been superseded by additional agreements since the creation of the document. While many aspects have changed since 1993, others still remain relevant.

Ukraine will continue to integrate with the European and international community by seeking to join international organizations and diversify its foreign trade. Organizations which Ukraine seeks to join include the Council of Europe, GATT, EU and the Central European Initiative. Ukraine will also strive to deepen its participation in structures where it is an existing member, such as NACC and NATO's Partnership for Peace.

2. Military-Technical Aspects of Doctrine

The only sort of conflict currently envisioned for the armed forces seems to be of the large-scale conventional type. The doctrine emphasizes the need to supply world-class weaponry (particularly precision strike, air, air defense and missile systems, electronic warfare, air-mobile units and an ocean-going navy). Ample redeployments are depicted in order to "organize an effective defense in all directions." Presently, for historical purposes, the sites of military bases and formations are directed to the execution of theater strategic offensive operations against NATO, while the Russian border is substantially bare. The doctrine calls for the possession of mass mobilization capability, emphasizing restraint or aversion to an invasion to affirm national independence in the sight of a perceived hostile Russia.

Security is not sought simply through the fielding of substantial armed forces. The doctrine emphasizes that political-diplomatic endeavors will be made to defuse potentially volatile situations and decrease confrontation. Indeed, the doctrine demands resolving all interstate disagreements by political means: all states, it implores, should strive to repudiate the use of force and respect others' national interests. This, of course, assumes that a potential enemy will honor the same rules and believe that it requires "two to negotiate." There is an implied misgiving in the doctrine, however, that Russia, will not. Some work will also go into establishing regional security systems. Though not explicitly, but through suggestion, these will have anti-Russianism as their uniting theme.

The readiness to appoint servicemen to the UN to "halt aggression...and support peace and security in different regions" may be attributed to a variety of reasons. Such acts will boost Ukraine's status in the global arena, and the country should, after all, strive to be an "influential power." They will also suggest to others that Ukraine is a reliable member of the European society of nations, to which a certain obligation is owed. Finally, they may incorporate some troops from a presently oversized army that cannot be readily decreased due to a fear of producing dissatisfaction from the public.

When creating personnel policy, the doctrine strives for an all-professional armed forces. Theoretically, these would be of a greater dependability during a crisis with Russia. In the meantime, however, cost considerations as well as the prejudices of a traditionally inclined, former

Soviet military leadership, prevent a departure from conscription. This Soviet mindframe is evident in the call for "military-patriotic education for preconscription and conscripted youth and all personnel." The will to resurrect a Soviet styled educational system and to incorporate military personnel in school and university curriculum, is most likely implied both here and in the remark that the armed forces educational framework is a significant sector of the state educational system. Not surprisingly, due to the dismaying conditions endured by many servicemen, the resolution of "questions relating to social protection" is deemed worthy in including as a principle. If the army is to be dependable, this surely merits the "first call on financial resources" that is in the military-economic sector. The elimination of political party influence in the armed forces may be reasonable but unpopular with many officers, particularly with those in the Union of Ukrainian Officers who became accustomed to exercising political authority. It must therefore be questioned whether a government decree could possibly cushion the army from possible political conflicts. [Ref. 48]

According to the Military Doctrine, the Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe (Appendix G - Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe) and the statement on numerical staff of Ukrainian Army approved by the Parliament Ukraine is required to reduce its army in all directions. One of the most critical considerations that requires full acknowledgement by the Parliament, is that a reduction of the army without determined tasks and coordinated activity of all its structures (with top priority given to staff and military equipment structures)

may lead to the loss of its fighting capability. Presently, President Kuchma considers that the essence of military reforms should be changed. However, reforming requires that a certain concept of reforms exist; a concept which Ukraine does not possess to this point (neither legally, nor in fact). Kuchma's comments to *Holos Ukrainy* on 13 October 1994, are closer to reality, when he stated that although reforms are possible, it is very likely that Ukraine would not be able to manage its own industrial and military potential. The problem of carrying out well-grounded military reform is complicated by the fact that armaments are scheduled to be reduced by November 1995 (according to the Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe). The present pace of armament reductions shows that Ukraine may not be able to implement the Treaty. [Ref. 49]

3. Military-Economic Aspects of Doctrine

The doctrine realizes the limits which (currently disastrous) economic situations impose on defense spending. It therefore demands a greater competency in the use of resources assigned to defense, for example, a requirement for competitive approach to acquisition. It seems that the military and defense industries, collectively a prevailing political force, have been losing power, and are now more under control of the Minister of Defense and the Parliament. Although, the undertone of the military-technical and military-economic sections of the Ukrainian doctrine repeat that of the Russians: a terse admission that finances are strained, succeeded by a shopping list redolent of

the Soviet-era spending sprees, reality is showing that under Kuchma's leadership, Ukraine is attempting to balance overall national economic needs with those of its military. This shows that the content of the military doctrine is not reflecting the reality of Ukraine's actions. Recently some changes have been instituted as a result of Kuchma's and Shmarov's incentives. The concept of saving money by means of applying competitive principles and contracts is becoming more prevalent not only with the defense suppliers but also in the civilian sector. [Ref. 50]

According to, Economy of Ukraine (No. 5, 1994) Ukraine produced 17 percent of the USSR's Gross Product and supplied approximately 23 percent of military products of the former Soviet Union, during the 1980's. Comparison of military equipment of the troops dislocated on Ukrainian territory and the share of this territory in the USSR leads to two conclusions: (1) the potential of the Ukrainian Military Industrial Complex exceeded its possible consumption; and (2) among former USSR republics, Ukraine was the most militarized.

According to the first variant of the State Budget expenses, the Defense Ministry constituted 21,976,000 million *karbovantsi (krb)*; later, according to the alterations made in the budget on 19 November 1994, these expenses were reduced to 1,000,000 million *krb*. However, it is important to mention that the Defense Ministry expenses on the purchase of armaments are overstated, since most military products of most MIC (military industrial complex) enterprises are not unprofitable, since production is financed by the State Budget according

to expenditures. The primary reasons for the cost of production growth include:

- proscription to entering commodity markets
- serial production drop
- 'naturalization' of production
- increase in investments needed
- absence of 'normal' organization of production
- rise of prices for parts and details

Despite of the sharp drop in production, unsold products constituted 11.5 trillion *krb*. [Ref. 51]

At first glance, the Ukrainian defense industrial complex is a massive entity that should have no problem becoming self-sufficient [Ref. 52]. The Ukrainian defense industrial complex comprises some 700 plants employing over 1 million workers. In addition about 17 percent of former Soviet defense production enterprises and about 11 percent of former Soviet defense scientific-research institutes are located in Ukraine [Ref. 53].

Although impressive, these figures are somewhat misleading. Russia clearly dominated the defense industrial sector of the former Soviet Union, accounting for 82 percent of the defense industrial complex [Ref. 54]. All of the top ten defense industrial cities in the former Soviet Union are in Russia [Ref. 55].

More important, the Ukrainian defense industrial sector at this point is not viable on its own. The Soviet planning system was highly interdependent, with all industrial organizations linked to the center. As a result, 70 percent of the Ukrainian economy is tied to Russia [Ref. 56]. Ukrainian President Kuchma has stated, 70-80 percent of Ukrainian industry works for Russia [Ref. 57]. A Kharkiv factory links with nearly 170 enterprises in Russia [Ref. 58]. Although Ukraine has a sizeable defense industrial complex, there are multiple gaps in its production. For example, Ukraine does not produce machine guns, semi-automatic rifles or pistols [Ref. 59]. It produces tanks but not tank guns [Ref. 60]. Finally, regardless of what they historically produced, Ukrainian defense industrialists are faced with a dramatic decline in demand. In 1993, defense production dropped by 65 percent compared to 1991. Defense industries are reportedly working at 20 percent capacity, often working only 2-3 days a week [Ref. 61].

The dilemma for the Ukrainians is whether they should maintain a defense industrial base integrated with Russia, a potential enemy, or try to create autonomous defense capabilities. Given their lack of capital and their interdependence with Russian defense enterprises, a quick drive for autocracy seems implausible, whatever Ukraine's long-term security concerns. [Ref. 62]

The last requirement assumes the Ukraine would enter the armaments markets which are occupied by Western countries, primarily the United States. Here Ukraine may use the experience of Israel, which modifies Soviet military equipment making it compatible with Western standards. Ukraine has a

powerful remount potential which could help it to adopt Israel's experience in this field. Unfortunately, the military industrial complex (MIC) of Russia, on which many Ukrainian enterprises still depend, are not only unstable but have reduced chaotically. This has negatively effected the Ukrainian MIC progress. Even worse is the fact that Ukraine still has no program of military equipment sales. In 1994 it planned to sell military equipment for 23,510 million *krb.* and according to alterations to the Budget on 19 November 1994 this sum was reduced nearly 35 times. [Ref. 63]

4. Present and Future Implications of the Military Doctrine

All the three aspects, especially the first one, have no temporal characteristic (*i.e.*, it is unclear whether today's realities or tasks for the future are meant). For example, one of the Doctrine's statements says: "Ukraine is against the presence of foreign troops on its territory..." yet Ukraine not only has foreign troops on its territory, but does not yet know when it will be able to get rid of them. Also, a spatial characteristic is absent in the Doctrine (*i.e.*, priorities and forms of military co-operation with other countries are not determined). Another paradox of the Doctrine is the absence of general concept of military reforms. Following the territorial division of the former Soviet Army, Ukraine needs to introduce changes concerning such important aspects as tasks, organizational and management principles, and structure. The concept of military reforms should reflect the tasks of Ukrainian Armed Forces creation in which military operations are directed at: local, regional, small

armed conflicts. Only after taking these factors into account can the Parliament and the Ministry of Defense decide what kind of army Ukraine needs. If and when these determinations are made they should become the heart of military reform.

With all the problems that exist with the Doctrine, it is possible to state that it is not a document which allows policy makers to determine the main directions of Ukrainian military policy. Weak points of the Doctrine may be illustrated by the attitude of both politicians and servicemen towards it. In spite of the fact that radical changes in any field of activity (including the military one) is still quite possible in Ukraine and very often depends on the changes in the government, the true reason for ignoring the Doctrine is the absence of determination of existing realities, temporal and spatial characteristics and concept of military reform in it.

According to many researchers, the Military Doctrine should be completely reworked on the basis of the developed military concept and should be approved by the VR. Unfortunately, according to, *Intelnews*, Ukraine's leading English-language news agency, Ukraine's Defense Minister, Valeriy Shmarov, stated in 1994 that he would not spur any major changes in Ukraine's defense policy. "Currently there is no need to introduce any corrections to Ukraine's military doctrine," Shmarov said on 28 August 1994. "The West need not worry about these changes. Ukraine's policies will not alter," said Volodymyr Mukhin, Parliament Defense and National Security Commission

chairman. "Appointment of a civilian as a defense minister shows that we are moving to a European standard." [Ref. 64]

At the same time, there are certain doubts that new doctrine could pass the Permanent Committee of the *Verkhovna Rada* on the questions of defense and state security. First, because of the low professional level of its members, and second, because of political sympathies of the majority of members of the Committee where the 'pro-Russia wing' has ten members (not counting so called non-party members). Overall, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, in spite of its validity, does not reflect existing realities of the developing world and European situation. In connection with this fact, Ukrainian leaders either ignore the Doctrine or do not agree with its statements. This in its turn does not allow Ukraine to create stable and legal relations with other countries.

Although the Military Doctrine of Ukraine needs to be reworked, the requirements that Kiev perceives for the UAF have become clear within the comparatively brief space of three years. Ukraine must be able to protect its northern and eastern borders in order to deter aggression from what many in Kiev still see as the possibility of a resurgent imperialist government to the north, since it cannot guarantee for itself the continuation of the peaceful, democratic process throughout the former Soviet Union. Ukraine must be able to protect its shipping and ports in the Black Sea area, and must be able to maintain internal control during the deepening economic crisis. In addition, it must also be able to respond, as it has done in the former Yugoslavia for the last two years, to the need for peacekeeping in the region, and it must be able

to integrate with its allies and partners in both the CIS and NATO to that end [Ref. 65]. To insure that all these requirements are met, it is crucial that a potent and credible force structure and levels exist within the UAF.

IV. FORCE STRUCTURE AND LEVELS

Although initial estimates of the size of armed forces located on the territory of Ukraine following the demise of the Soviet Union varied, it was not until January 1992 that a more realistic accounting was obtained, namely 726,000. It was generally agreed that a force of this size had to be reduced: Ukraine needed a smaller force for its defense and one that it could afford. [Ref. 66]

On 19 October 1993, the Ukrainian Supreme Council finally approved the end strength for the Ukrainian armed forces at 450,000 personnel. The main components of the military reform concept call for reorganizing military administration and command, redeploying the forces to adapt them to the new military and geographical reality and reducing the force structure manpower and equipment to meet two primary criteria - the principle of "reasonable defense sufficiency" and the ceilings established by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1992. [Ref. 67]

The original "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe" (CFE) was signed by the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on 19 November 1990, almost one year prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the 12 republics (less the three Baltic states) issued a joint declaration in *Tashkent* (15 May 1992) in which they, as successor states to the Soviet Union, agreed to apportion among themselves the Treaty of Limited Equipment, originally

allotted to the former Soviet Union. On 10 July 1992, a Concluding Act on the limitation of personnel strengths was signed in Helsinki (based on a previous Vienna agreement) by NATO members, former members of the Warsaw Pact and seven republics of the former Soviet Union having forces located in the Atlantic to the Urals region. The CFE ceilings for Ukraine, to be implemented by the end of 1995, are as follows (figures in parentheses show current declared strengths):

- Armed Forces: 450,000 (726,000)
- Tanks: 4,080 (6,300)
- Armored Combat Vehicles: 5,050 (6,170)
- Artillery: 4,040 (3,080)
- Aircraft: 1,090 (1,380)
- Combat Helicopters: 330 (240)

The actual progress for meeting these figures, is however proceeding slowly and therefore will continue into 1996 and thereafter. [Ref. 68]

In the summer of 1992, three former Soviet military districts - Transcarpathian, Odessa and Kiev - were formally abolished and replaced with the Western and Southern Operational commands and Central Command centered in Kiev. As the restructuring proceeded, the ground operational forces were being gradually reassigned to the two operational commands, while other operational (large combat support and service support units) and

non-operational elements (such as military school systems and training bases) are being subordinated to the central command.

This restructuring created two Strategic Groupings: a Western region (former Carpathian Military District), and a Southern region (former Odessa Military District). The Kiev Military District was abolished and its assets were used to create "a central administration." Presumably, again for reasons of political sensitivity, no operational command was established in eastern Ukraine, facing Russia, although near the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994, some restructured operational forces were deployed to eastern regions. [Ref. 69]

It could be argued that the problems of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the first three years of existence stemmed from two main sources: the failure to estimate correctly the effort and cost involved in reforming the armed forces; and a disagreement regarding what "reasonable defense sufficiency" meant in terms of technology and strength of the armed forces. To best understand the force levels and structure of the UAF it is crucial to review the specifics as they apply to the Main General Staff of the UAF and each of the three service branches.

A. THE MAIN (GENERAL) STAFF OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

As was the case in the former Soviet Armed Forces, the evolution of the UAF and the degree of excellence and combat effectiveness to which they aspire, will depend on the experience, intellectual capacity, and administrative ability of the Chief of the Main Staff and his senior assistants. Since January 1992 there have been a number of changes at the top, reflecting a mood of uncertainty within the Ukrainian High Command stemming in part from political pressure.

While the Ukrainians initially eschewed the designation "General," the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is modeled for the most part on its Soviet/Russian counterpart (Appendix H - Supreme Command). The nucleus comprises a Main Operations Directorate, a Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate, a Communication Directorate, a Military Intelligence Directorate, and a Directorate of Personnel. The Ukrainian Main Staff, however, also contains the following Directorates: Missile Troops and Artillery; Air Force and Air Defense; Armaments; Engineering Troops; Education and Training Branch, Chemical Defense, and the Inspectorate of Training.

Aside from the minor structural changes in the Main General Staff, the ethnic composition of this staff is still unequally distributed. The majority of senior officers now serving in the Main Staff and other branches of the Defense Ministry are graduates of the Moscow General Staff Academy of the 1980s and early 1990s. While Ukraine is seeking alternative outlets, it is likely that the

General Staff Academy will continue to receive Ukrainian promising officers based on a bilateral agreement between the two countries. At the time of the declaration of Ukrainian independence there were about 20 Ukrainian officers either at the Academy, or scheduled to be enrolled. As of 1995, the majority of officers in the General Staff, still continue to be of Russian dissent. More specifics on the ethnic imbalance in the General Staff is addressed in Chapter VI (Ethno-security Map). [Ref. 70]

B. THE UKRAINIAN ARMY

In terms of force structure, Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union the following ground forces: five armies, one army corps, 18 divisions (twelve motorized, four tank and two airborne), three airborne brigades, three artillery divisions and a host of combat support and combat service support units. The reform concept calls for abandoning the army structure and reconfiguring these forces by 1995 into three army corps, seven motorized rifle divisions, two tank divisions, seven motorized rifle divisions, two tank divisions, five motorized rifle brigades, two tank brigades and two airmobile brigades (restructured from former airborne divisions), nine artillery brigades, four antiaircraft brigades, three combat engineer brigades, three chemical protection brigades and three surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades. The motorized rifle divisions and brigades will be converted into mechanized units. The ground army is in the process of being reduced from its 1992 strength of 245,000 to 180,000 by 1995. This three-year reform will result in an Interim Force - "the army of 1995." This

reform program is slated to be streamlined further by 1999, with the objective of developing a base force - "the army of 2000" - a ground army of 95,000 consisting of the following operational maneuver units: five mechanized infantry divisions, one tank division, seven mechanized infantry brigades, three tank brigades, two airmobile brigades and an appropriate mix of combat support and combat service support elements. [Ref. 71]

In April/May 1994 the first phase of restructuring the present army/division order of battle to a corps/brigade level of operations was initiated. This transformation is expected to occur by the end of 1995, although the more realistic end product will most likely result in 1996. In addition to the restructuring process, numerous formations will be disbanded in the course of the projected reduction of force levels in Ukraine. The elite 24th Motor Rifle Division (Lvov) will probably be retained, while the bulk of the 98th Airborne Division, which was taken over by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry in June 1992, will form part of the planned Ukrainian "rapid reaction" mobile force, together with the *spetsnaz* brigade. [Ref. 72]

C. THE UKRAINIAN AIR FORCE

Ukraine inherited from the former Soviet Union assets that make the Ukrainian air force the third largest in the world. Its inventory includes long-range bombers, transport planes, strike aircraft, reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes, a large contingent of tactical and air defense fighters and training aircraft. The former four air armies are being restructured into three

aviation groups and one naval aviation group. Air force personnel will be cut from its 1992 strength of 86,000 to 25,000 by 1999, while the inventory of 1,380 combat planes will be reduced to 1,090 in 1995 and to 590 by 1999. The air defense contingent is being reshaped from one air defense army and three corps into three air defense corps, and its strength will be reduced from its present 67,000 to 26,000 personnel. The air defense forces, previously an independent branch, were subordinated under the Ukrainian air force as a subcommand. [Ref. 73] There has always been little cooperation between these two organizations but their combination is the only major reallocation of role and resources to have taken place outside the other service branches. The disposition of troops between the Military Districts, to include the command structure after the creation of the MOD and the Ukrainian General Staff, has remained mostly as it was at the time of Ukraine's declaration of independence.

D. THE UKRAINIAN NAVY

The status of the third arm of the Ukrainian armed forces, the navy, is still in temporary abeyance; it currently constitutes the weakest link in the Ukrainian defense system. Naval reform is more problematic as the status of the Black Sea Fleet, from which the Ukrainian naval force is to evolve, has become mired in a tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine over the issue of how to divide the naval assets. Despite at least six attempts to resolve the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, it is not clear if a workable final solution will be signed by President Kuchma and Yeltsin. This is because the main issue is not the

fleet itself, which consists of outdated and strategically unimportant vessels, but the naval bases and infrastructure in Southern Ukraine and the Crimea. Recognition of Ukraine's borders by Russia in an interstate treaty which included Crimea, would help to resolve the Black Sea Fleet question. The Ukrainian side has consistently complained, however, that despite the election of a more accommodating Ukrainian president Russia's negotiating demands have remained intractable. "All of the old Russian attitudes are preserved in the new proposals," Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyi, Ukraine's naval chief complained. [Ref. 74] Russian demands for a 99-year exclusive lease on Sevastopol have been rejected by Kiev in favor of leases for five- to ten-year periods during which Sevastopol would be used by both the Ukrainian and Russian Fleets. In a meeting at Yalta on 3 August 1992, Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and Ukraine's President Kravchuk agreed in principle, although not in actual specific numbers and categories of vessels, to divide the fleet and had thereby seemingly defused a potentially explosive situation by postponing the final resolution of this issue until the summer of 1995. Since then, a bilateral Russian and Ukrainian working commission drafted an agreement on the apportionment of fleet assets. This formula has not worked because, in practice, the whole fleet was being gradually and unilaterally converted into a national "Russian fleet," aggravating the already serious friction between Ukraine and Russia. At a subsequent meeting in Massandra, Crimea, on 3 September 1993, the Russian delegation headed by Yeltsin reportedly cajoled Ukraine's Kravchuk into signing a protocol, whereby Ukraine would "sell" part

or most of its share of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia as a repayment of its outstanding hard currency debt. The current Black Sea Fleet consists of approximately 645 mostly aging ships and 72,000 men. [Ref. 75] As the unresolved crisis continues, the nucleus of an independent Ukrainian navy is being formed, consisting primarily of ships newly built in Ukrainian shipyards, placed under Ukrainian naval administrative and operational command and manned by personnel who have sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian state. The formation of a small marine force contingent and a naval aviation unit has begun. The Ukrainian government has also taken control over much of the naval shore-based facilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine has the necessary shipbuilding capability but, for the near future, may not be able to allocate the necessary resources that are needed elsewhere. [Ref. 76]

One of the key structural changes to the armed forces have been to the navy, whose fleet of six vessels is a far cry from the vast commitment of the Black Sea Fleet. Although some analysts may disagree, the Black Sea Fleet issue itself seems closer than ever to resolution. Recent talks in Moscow have produced some progress and it is possible that there is an end to the dispute in sight. In the meantime, the Black Sea Fleet represents for Ukraine a vast drain on financial, military and diplomatic resources for no tactical or strategic advantage. [Ref. 77] Although many details have yet to be worked out, in June 1995 President Yeltsin and Kuchma signed an accord, in Sochi, on dividing the Black Sea Fleet. Its provisions dictate the Russia will receive 82 percent of the fleet's vessels, while Ukraine will receive 18 percent. It also states that the

property will be split 50/50, and that the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy will have separate bases, allowing the Russians to be temporarily headquartered in Sevastopol. This agreement further established that:

- The Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy will have separate bases.
- The fleet's main base and Headquarters will be located in the city of Sevastopol.
- The Black Sea Fleet will have use of fleet facilities in the city of Sevastopol and of other basing and deployment sites for ships, aircraft and coast-guard forces and operational, combat, technical and rear-service facilities in Crimea.
- Russia will take part in the social and economic development of Sevastopol and other communities where the Black Sea Fleet will be based.
- A joint commission consisting of the Russian and Ukrainian state delegations to the talks on the Black Sea Fleet will be created to monitor implementation of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. The commission will be charged with working out the specific parameters of the division of Black Sea Fleet facilities.

At this time, a very delicate situation is developing with regard to the Fleet. On the one hand, a "breakthrough" agreement seems to have been reached that resolves many previous disputes. On the other hand, the agreement is written in vague language (the result of compromise), and that vague phrasing is giving rise to differing interpretations. [Ref. 78]

E. PARA-MILITARY FORCES

As in most post-Soviet successor states, including Russia, more resources have been diverted towards specialist internal security units because of the perception of the country's leaders that domestic threats are more dangerous than external invasions, which are unlikely, at least in the short term. In Ukraine, the National Guard will be increased to 50,000 troops. Its function is to act in the same paramilitary role as the French CRS or Italian Carabinieri. They support the militia in times of domestic disturbances, such as in the Crimea, or the Border Troops in the event of border disputes. The Border Troops number between 15,000 and 20,000 and now patrol all of Ukraine's borders. They were introduced on the Russian-Ukrainian border in January 1993 (in other areas Border Troops were deployed before 1991 on the former frontier of the Soviet Union).

The State Protection Service, formerly under the Soviet KGB, now has the task of protecting the president, parliament and government. The Security Service of Ukraine, the successor to the KGB, continues to combine both external and internal intelligence gathering, as well as counterintelligence work. The Ministry of Internal Affairs now has large specialist forces under its command, geared to deal with domestic disturbances. The former Soviet riot police (OMON) were restructured as the *Berkut* (Golden Eagles) riot police. These are mainly professionals who have served previously in parachute, marine or National Guard units as conscripts. In addition to these, the Ministry

of Internal Affairs continues to control large numbers of Internal Troops whose duties are the same as in the Soviet times - guarding communications and prisons. The State Automobile Inspectorate (DAI) also continues to function as an armed unit. [Ref. 79]

F. PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE: 1992 - 2000

Immediately after the declaration of independence of 24 August 1991, senior officials, Deputies of the Supreme Soviet and figures across the radical political spectrum, welcomed the decision to confiscate former Soviet military assets on Ukrainian soil and established national armed forces. In most cases, however, estimates of the size, role, and structure of the future Ukrainian army were wide of the mark, and were dictated above all by emotion. While most commentators spoke of a "nuclear-free" Ukraine, with regard to the size of the armed forces some envisaged a total of "half a million" men. This emotional program was soon revised, and in early October the new Defense Minister Morozov had reduced the figure to "around 300,000." Some months were to pass before Morozov put forward a clear program for the period 1992-2000.

The initial eight-year period for creation of the Ukrainian armed forces was divided into four stages. Stage one, 1992-1993, was to be devoted to the establishment of central organs of command and control: Defense Ministry; Main Staff; and the basic infrastructure of the arms of service. The second stage, 1993-1994, would see the elaboration of a military doctrine, governing the structure and role of the arms of service (Appendix I - Troop Strength

(000)). During stage three, 1995-1997, the basis would be laid for structuring a system of mobile forces, with a reliable reserve. At the same time, the 1992 level of 657,000 officers and men would be cut by 1997 to around 400,000. Finally, between 1997 and the year 2000, overall force levels would be reduced to around 200,000. [Ref. 80]

With regard to the crucial first stage of the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, by early 1993 the basic infrastructure was in place. With a few notable exceptions, the "personnel problem" had been temporarily solved with former Soviet officers, Russians and Ukrainians assigned to the key posts. Irrelevant of how Ukrainians felt about Russians in critical decision making roles, they possessed more military expertise than the Ukrainians did. This was primarily due to the "ethnic security map" that existed in the days of the Soviet Union, which allowed the Russians, who held the upper hand, to maintain experience. The second phase, which has required a further elaboration of the military doctrine, has only partially been worked out. The Military Doctrine of Ukraine continues to remain a very vague document, lacking sufficient guidance for the military leadership and policy makers. According to current Defense Minister Shmarov, as of 28 August 1994, no changes in the Military Doctrine were required. It seems that the initial eight-year plan for the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has bogged down in politics and progress for stages two, three and four will be most likely be more difficult than initially thought.

A Ukrainian serviceman today would notice little difference from the service his predecessors experienced in the Soviet army of 1989-1990. Soldiers are garrisoned in the same places, receive the same equipment and, when there is fuel and ammunition available, receive the same training. Despite the high-level administrative reorganization and the complicating factor of political disagreements in the armed forces, for the majority of military units in Ukraine, it is still very much business as usual. The real issue of military reform which is yet to be completed is in the organization of a command and control structure subject to Kiev and reflecting a concept of defense which truly shapes the armed forces into a cohesive force reflecting the needs of the state. This process will take some time. [Ref. 81]

Ukraine has reduced the number of men under arms by at least 200,000 over the last three years. Current estimates put the number of servicemen at approximately 450,000 (Appendix J - Ukraine's Military Balance: 1994-1995). The country's Defense Doctrine sets a target of 250,000, and few Ukrainian servicemen or politicians now contest this figure. The eventual aim is to establish a professional armed services.

V. STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

To best understand the strategic and operational factors (force levels, structure, potential application, and education) impacting the UAF, it is crucial to briefly present a net assessment of Ukraine's nuclear status, Ukraine's current military defense strategy options, the restructured military education system that will frame the future forces, and finally, the latest base force figures (1995) compared to the initial declared strengths in 1992.

A. NUCLEAR STATUS

By all accounts, Ukraine immediately after its independence, by default, was the third largest nuclear power in the world, having inherited from the former Soviet Union 176 land-based nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) with 1,240 nuclear warheads, plus 41 strategic nuclear bombers with an additional 460 warheads on bombs and cruise missiles. The Ukrainian government has vowed to make Ukraine a nuclear-free state once the nuclear weapons are disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I (START I) Treaty, which is a precondition for ratification and implementation by the United States and Russia of a more radical nuclear disarmament agreement, START II. Ukrainian leaders have sensed that these nuclear weapons provide Ukraine with a formidable, albeit military deterrent capability, and they have evinced serious concerns about

Ukraine's security once these weapons are removed. After a long period of negotiations and resisting pressure from the West, the Ukrainian parliament finally ratified the START I treaty on 18 November 1993, but with ten substantive reservations. Key among these are demands for:

- Security guarantees after Ukraine becomes non-nuclear.
- Financial assistance to defray the cost of dismantling.
- Compensation for the fissile material.

The Supreme Council agreed to have 36 percent of Ukraine's 176 strategic missiles and 42 percent of its warheads destroyed as soon as proper international financial and technical assistance is provided. As a result of further intensive negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the United States, and an apparent radical change of positions by the United States and Russia on the three key Ukrainian demands, a trilateral treaty was signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994 by the Presidents of all three nations. The provisions of the treaty call for Ukraine to de-nuclearize itself within seven years. On 3 February 1994, the Ukrainian parliament removed its reservations to START I, thereby, in effect, ratifying the treaty, yet at the same time it postponed its decision on joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [Ref. 82]. On 13 January 1995, Ukraine's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force. It covers all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Ukraine, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere (nuclear weapons still on

territory are excluded). Due to Ukraine's recent accession to the NPT, an NPT-type safeguards agreement will supersede the current one. *Ad hoc* IAEA inspections began in February 1995. [Ref. 83]

1. Accelerated Transfer

Prior to 1994, progress in transferring nuclear weapons to Russia progressed at an extremely slow pace. The key reason for Ukraine's hesitation in transferring nuclear weapons lay in the Ukrainian Parliament's doubts and suspicions of Russian intentions. After receiving "security assurances" from the Western powers and realizing that it does not have the capacity to endure the high costs for maintaining such an arsenal, Ukraine decided to accelerate the transfer of such technology to Russia. During the remainder of 1994, the pace of Ukrainian denuclearization accelerated as Ukraine exceeded the initial phases of the deactivation and transfer process outlined in the Trilateral Statement. The Statement specified that by mid-November 1994, all SS-24s on Ukrainian territory were to be deactivated. In fact, by early December 1994, not only had Ukraine deactivated all its SS-24s, but it had also deactivated 40 out of its 130 SS-19s. Second, the Trilateral Statement called for Ukraine to transfer at least 200 warheads from its SS-19s and SS-24s to Russia by mid November [Ref. 84]. Ukraine also exceeded this goal, transferring 360 warheads by that date, and, as of February 1995, it had transferred a total of 420 SS-24, SS-19, and heavy bomber warheads back to Russia [Ref. 85].

On November 16, 1994, the *Rada* took the next step to confirm its denuclearization commitments, approving Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Once again, however, it imposed a condition, making Ukraine's accession contingent upon first receiving security guarantees by the nuclear states.

2. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

At the Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Budapest on December 5, 1994, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia provided security guarantees to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. France also provided security guarantees to Ukraine at the CSCE summit in a separate document. On the same occasion, Ukraine presented its instruments of accession to the NPT. This action, together with the earlier accessions by Belarus and Kazakhstan, satisfied Russia's conditions for exchanging the instruments of ratification for the START I Treaty. Consequently, at the same meeting, the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine exchanged their START I Treaty instruments of ratification, finally bringing the Treaty into force [Ref. 86].

3. Nuclear Infrastructure

Ukraine's civilian nuclear power program is comprised of five stations, each with a number of reactors either operating or under construction. (Appendix K - Ukraine and its Nuclear Resources) These stations are located at Pripyat/Chernobyl, Neteshin, Kuznetsovsk, Konstantinovsk, and Energodar. [Ref. 87]

There are no reprocessing or uranium enrichments plants in Ukraine that would give it the capability to produce weapons-usable plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). However, the Kharkiv Physical-Technical Institute has in its possession up to 75 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade HEU in bulk form enriched up to 90 percent [Ref. 88]. Since this nuclear material is not yet under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, it could be of proliferation concern.

Ukraine has inherited much of the Soviet missile production industrial base, which it plans to utilize for the manufacture of space-launch systems for export. However, this infrastructure also gives Ukraine the capability to produce or export ballistic missiles. Certain space equipment is already being produced at the Yuzhmash Plant, a former SS-18 major production facility at Dnipropetrovsk. Moreover, a former SS-24 production plant at Pavlograd, which believed to be in operation still, may be engaged in similar research and development activities [Ref. 89]. Presently Ukraine possesses 39 SS-19 ICBMs, 580 ALCMs and Gravity Bombs, 578 long-range ALCMs, and two short-range ALCMs. Under the terms of the Trilateral Statement, all SS-24s have been deactivated. Many SS-24s may have been removed from their silos and the warheads are being transferred to Russia [Ref. 90] (Appendix L - Weapon Systems and Warheads in Ukraine).

One of the primary concerns for Western countries is the control of nuclear material flowing out of the former Soviet republics. To enhance counter-proliferation of such materials export controls have been emplaced, by

creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Ukraine is not a member and is not adhering to the NSG standards. It had sent an observer in March 1992 to the NSG meeting in Warsaw, and had requested similar observer status for the 1994 NSG meeting in Madrid, but was denied that status. In March 1995, Ukraine reaffirmed its intentions to become a member of the NSG and sent papers to the Secretariat of the IAEA to that effect. The IAEA invited Ukraine to attend the Helsinki meeting as observers. The Government is currently working to conform Ukraine's legislation with NSG guidelines [Ref. 91]. Since its independence, Ukraine has only formally approved two nuclear-related items for export. This licensed export occurred in 1993 and consisted of uranium ore and the rare-earth metal bismuth [Ref. 92]. In a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Washington on May 13, 1994, Ukraine agreed to conduct its missile-and space-related exports according to the criteria and standards of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) [Ref. 93]. It is not, however, a formal member of the MCTR.

4. Command, Control and Communication (C3)

Ukrainian authorities seem to have gained full control over the strategic forces troops whose sole mission is to protect and man the nuclear weapons sites in Ukraine. They are composed mainly of the 43rd Missile Army and related components with 40,000 to 50,000 men. In the fall of 1992, the Ukrainian government assumed unilateral administrative control over them on

the pretext that they are based on Ukrainian territory and that the Ukrainian government has since June 1992 been providing them with pay, subsistence and shelter. Having been thus removed from decisions concerning the manning, training and combat readiness of the strategic forces in Ukraine, the Supreme Command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, a paper formation only, was dissolved on 15 June 1993, and the operational command (less command over the strategic forces) was assumed by the Russian General Staff. Apparently encouraged by these developments, the Ukrainian Supreme Council on 2 July 1993 declared full ownership of all nuclear assets on Ukrainian territory. [Ref. 94]

In the fall of 1992, the Ukrainian General Staff disconnected the lines of communication between Moscow and major units in Ukraine, thereby assuming full command and control over these forces. Since then, it has been developing its own command, control and communication (C3) system for all major units on the Ukrainian territory except for the operational control of the strategic forces and that part of the Black Sea Fleet which is still under Russian and Ukrainian nominal dual control. [Ref. 95]

B. UKRAINE'S MILITARY DEFENSE STRATEGY AND OPTIONS

With the exception of de-nuclearization of its arsenal, for the last several years, Ukraine's attempt to reform its military has been extremely slow. Similarly, the development of specifics for a potential defense strategy on Ukraine's eastern border has also proceeded slowly. This is a crucial factor,

since, without such a plan, it is difficult to restructure the military force structure, levels, tasks and priorities. Although it seems that the specifics of such strategies have not yet been planned, an overall concept has been vaguely discussed at the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense and the Main General Staff. The defense concept includes three options:

- forward defense
- mobile defense
- strategic defense in depth

To best understand these three options, it is important to briefly discuss each and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. Due to limited open source in this arena, the basic concepts have been applied to the analysis of Dr. Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [Ref. 96]

1. Forward Defense

This strategy would require the Ukrainian military to attempt to prevent Russian incursion into most of its territory, and would not require the direct defense of every inch of frontier, but even with the "wrinkles ironed out," the Russian border alone would comprise a 1000 kilometer (km) front. In this strategy, there would be no particular terrain features that could aid the defense. The weakness of this strategy is that Ukraine's fourteen-odd heavy divisions and five brigades would have a very difficult time covering this front.

Using the rule of thumb that a "medium sized/medium technology" armored or mechanized division which the UAF possess can control 25-35 kilometers (km) of the front on average terrain, with weaponry in sufficient density and depth to provide good prospects for a successful defense against a determined, well-armed, superior attacker, it is estimated, that only 60 percent of the front could be covered. This would leave the defense vulnerable to large scale flanking maneuvers or Ukraine could cover the whole front at one division per 60 kilometer (km), with no reserves. This thin defense would be vulnerable to easy punctures followed by envelopments and then further exploitation.

Forward defense is seductive to many Ukrainians, because of the high concentration of the Ukrainian industry that is located in the east, particularly in the Donetsk region. In addition roughly 40 percent of the Ukrainian population is situated in the eastern part of Ukraine. Ukrainians fear that once lost, these areas would unlikely be returned to Ukraine. From a military perspective, based on the current force structure, it seems that this strategy would end up in disaster. [Ref. 97]

2. Mobile Defense

This strategy would force Ukraine to gather its mechanized forces into several multi-divisional operational groupings (corps or armies), and attempt through a combination of better intelligence, superior tactical and operational proficiency, brilliant leadership, and high mobility, to "box" with roughly twice as many similar Russian groupings. The purpose would be to maneuver for

advantage, and to fight only under conditions that would produce greatly favorable exchange rates. This would involve large scale "ambushes" of unsuspecting Russian formations on the move, slashing surprise flank attacks, and speedily executed and completed encirclement operations. Space would often be traded for time. These are very demanding operations.

This strategy, unlike the previous one, would concede when necessary bloodless Russian occupation of the eastern areas of Ukraine, although it would focus on recovering these areas once Russian forces would be smashed in maneuver battles. The key problem with this strategy is that if the Russians adopt a limited aims strategy and do not go much beyond these zones, the mobile defense strategy would fail, and the Ukrainians would have to face a strong Russian force that possesses quantitative superiority, technological parity, air superiority, and the advantages that normally accrue to a tactical defender. Aside from the Russian "limited-aims" offensive, there are no obvious reasons why Ukrainians should be able to outfight Russians in mobile warfare. In eastern Ukraine, the population - both Russian and indifferent Ukrainian - could, in many areas, prove more hostile to Ukrainian soldiers than to Russians. In addition, Ukrainians would be outnumbered by two-to-one, or worse.

In the event Ukraine attempts a true mobile defense against any plausible Russian military strategy, limited aims or otherwise, all of the foregoing adds up to great probability that Ukrainian operational groupings would be surrounded, cut off from outside sources of supply, and annihilated. [Ref. 98]

3. Strategic Defense in Depth

The last strategy that may be employed by Ukraine in defense from its Russian neighbor, is the "strategic defense in depth." Based on the present force levels and the political-economic reality that Ukraine presently is in, this strategy is the most plausible. This strategy would not attempt to hold all of Ukraine against all challenges, but it would create an array of probable costs and plausible risks to a future aggressor. If properly organized, Ukrainian forces would be able to fight a tough delaying action in the eastern half of the country. Ukrainian forces would then be able to offer a resilient defense of the other half of the country, west of the Dnipro River, against a very strong attack. A careful exploitation of the Pripet Marshes to the north and the Dnipro River should permit the Ukrainians to develop a plausible bastion that the Russians would have to pay a high price to attack. Therefore, these geographical barriers must be viewed as building blocks in a defensive system. Although such a plan would best suit the present UAF, it may also fail if Ukrainian forces cannot produce or import the fuel and munitions necessary for modern warfare. Although the Ukrainians might wish for something better than this, it will be very difficult for them to achieve a high-confidence conventional defense on most of their territory.

Overall, it is important that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Main General Staff begin thinking of the specifics in these scenarios and decide upon a strategy, so that they may appropriately structure and reform their forces. Even more importantly, if the MOD is to make Ukraine's national security

credible, it is necessary to force the Russians to think twice about aggression of any kind. In order to achieve this, Ukrainian peacetime foreign policy, military strategy and force structure must be organized to convince a future Russian aggressor that the initial military costs of an attack on Ukraine will be high, and that there is meaningful risk or serious long term strategic costs. Thus, a Ukrainian strategy of conventional deterrence requires a resilient military that can resist intensively for a significant period of time. [Ref. 99]

C. THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY SCHOOL SYSTEM

Since August 1991, the disputes between Kiyv and Moscow over the fate of the strategic nuclear weapons and other "strategic assets" on Ukrainian soil and the Black Sea Fleet appear to have attracted most attention. Meanwhile, another change has been taking place which will possibly be of greater significance in the long term for the Ukrainian Armed Forces: the restructuring and reform of the former Soviet military educational system.

In addition to gaining control of nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian defense establishment also inherited 34 military schools and military faculties at 78 institutions of higher learning, far too many for its needs. The old educational system was bureaucratic and extremely redundant, making it too costly in the midst of economic hardship and required personnel cuts. A decision was made to streamline the educational structure in order to meet the "reasonable sufficiency" levels. The current plan calls for reorganizing the military education system as follows:

- Armed Forces Staff Academy (*Kiyv*)
- Military University (*Kharkiv*)
- Three joint military colleges
- Five branches of service colleges
- Forty-eight military faculties at institutions of higher learning
- Nine military lyceums (mid-level schools)
- Eleven military research centers (space and meteorological; C3 and electronic warfare; two air defense centers; precision weapons; air combat; naval operations; military medicine; military procurement and personnel staffing; humanities; and socio-psychological service). [Ref. 100]

All the former Soviet military schools have been uprooted, in many cases combining to form one institution; in some cases schools have been abolished altogether. In answer to calls from radical political groups, universities, and higher educational institutes, the number of Military Chairs (*viennaya kafedra*) training students and reservists will be reduced from 73 to 43.

The 1992 Decree on the Ukrainian Military Education, Specialist and Reservist Training represented a full-blooded program of 'conversion.' It also introduced a number of novel concepts designed to bring military education in Ukraine into the twenty-first century. The most important and symbolic break with the former Soviet system was the introduction of the Military University (*Voenniy Universitet*) and Institute (*Voenniy Institut*), something between an Academy and Military School. The other significant innovation was the Military Lyceum (*Voenniy Litsei*), in most cases formed out of the assets of the

Military School (*Voennoe uchilishche*). The Military Lyceum, of which there were to be nine by September 1993 serving all four services and specialist support arms, did not, however, replace the former Soviet military school. The purpose of these Lyceums was to provide a qualitatively high standard of education for young candidates prior to entering a higher educational institution. In part, the changes reflect Western influence, and are a result of a study of the U.S., German, and French educational systems. In line with the change in nomenclature the curriculum, there will be a greater emphasis on the role of the 'humanities' in the education of cadets and mature students. [Ref. 101]

To best describe the Ukrainian military system it is crucial to briefly discuss the higher military education, senior military institutes, ground defence forces, air force, and the naval educational system, the specialists' military education, and security and intelligence services education.

1. Higher Military Education

The most senior institution is the Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Located in Kiyv, the Academy now occupies the building which housed the former Military Academy of Troop Air Defense down to May 1992. The Academy provides "senior command courses" to senior officers from the four arms of service. The ten-month courses are "as elsewhere in the world," according to Colonel Yury Prokof'ev, the Chief of the Military Education Directorate.

To date, there has been no mention of a Ukrainian "General Staff Academy," providing higher strategic command courses for senior officers. Promising officers continue to be sent to the General Staff Academy in Moscow. In the long-term it is hoped to send promising officers to Staff Colleges in the West. At present, two senior officers are on a one-year course in the United States.

After the Academy of the UAF, the Kharkiv Military University is the most important of the new teaching institutions to be established in Ukraine. This university is located on the premises of the former Military Engineer Radio Technical Academy of the Air Defense Forces, and trains radio electronics specialists for the service branches. In addition, it trains specialists in strategic automated command and control systems. [Ref. 102]

2. Senior Military Institutes

The term "institute" in its military connotation is a radically new concept. The Ukrainian Cabinet 1992 Decree provides for the establishment of seven Military Institutes, which rank between military school and academy status. The Kiev Military Institute of Humanities provides courses in social sciences, personnel management, the humanities, psychology, and pedagogy. Courses last 10-12 months and graduates are awarded diplomas equal in status to a Bachelors Degree, and will be expected eventually to study for a Masters Degree in their field of expertise.

The Kiev Military Institute of Command Systems and Communications was designated as the Military Institute of Command Systems and Intelligence. The provision of military communications specialists and electronics intelligence (ELINT) experts, is regarded as a top priority by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

The remaining five Institutes are controlled by the respective services: the Ground Defense Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and the Navy. [Ref. 103]

3. Ground Defense Forces

By September 1993, the Ukrainian Ground Defense Forces controlled two Military Institutes and two Military Lyceums. The Kiev Military Institute of the Ground Defense Forces replaced and integrated the Kiev Higher Tank Engineer School and the Kiev Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Engineer School. The Institute opened on 1 September 1992. The Odessa Military Institute of the Ground Defense Forces also opened on 1 September 1992. These two institutes provide six- to twelve-month courses for all-arms battalion/ brigade commanders - motor rifle, artillery, and tank - and in essence fulfill the role formerly played in the education of the junior command by the Frunze Military Academy, the Artillery Academy, and the Tank Troops Academy in Moscow.

The basic education of officer cadets who normally take the entrance examination at 18 years of age is now provided by the Military Lyceum, an innovation and deliberate attempt by Ukrainian authorities to erase the links

with the former Soviet military school. Two Ground Forces Military Lyceums opened on 1st September 1992: the Kiev Military Lyceum for motor rifle and tank commanders; and the Sumi Military Lyceum for junior artillery commanders. [Ref. 104]

4. Air Force Educational System

The gap left by the loss of free access to the Moscow Air Academy has been keenly felt by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. In order to make good the deficiency at a higher level, a plan was put forward in March by Defense Minister Morozov to combine a number of former Soviet military aviation schools to create two Air Force Institutes. With the creation of the Kiev Air Force Institute emphasis is on training high-class engineers during a five-year course. A special faculty monitors developments in new generation aerospace technology, and recalls senior specialists for short refresher courses.

The second Air Forces Institute, located in Kharkov acquired the bulk of the former institutions. It is the main center for training pilots, navigators, and junior commanders for the Ukrainian Air Forces. Courses are of four to five years duration. Given the congested airspace over Kharkov, the Institute continues to maintain airfields located respectively in Chernigov and Lugansk for basic flight training.

Beneath the two senior Air Force Institutes are two Military Lyceums. The Chernihiv Military Lyceum was formed with a role to provide basic "familiarization" courses of six- to twelve months duration for 18-20 year old

cadets. Only after completing the course successfully will they then go on to complete their education at the Kharkiv Air Force Institute, following a period of service with an aviation unit. The second Lyceum, located in Kharkiv, trains junior fitters and mechanics in 12-month courses. Experience will be grafted onto theory during service in an aviation unit prior to going on to Kiyv Air Force Institute.

Since the Air Defense Forces were swallowed by the Air Force, the Air Defense community retains two Lyceums. The Dneipropetrovsk Military Lyceum is the main center for training junior commanders for ground-based SAM units. The second institution, the Zhitomir Military Lyceum provides courses for radio electronic air surveillance and tracking officers. [Ref. 105]

5. Ukrainian Naval Education

Despite the outcry in Kiev over the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian Navy will be the smallest of the four services. Confined to the Black Sea, in conjunction with two brigades of the former USSR KGB Border Troops, its role will be coastal protection. The main center for training naval officers will be the Sevastopol Naval Institute. There is as yet no provision to establish a Naval Lyceum along the lines of the former Soviet Nakhimov Naval School for 14-18 year old cadets, the naval equivalent of the Suvorov Military School.

6. Specialist Military Education

The structure of specialist training provided for support services, reservist officers, and adolescents liable or volunteering for premilitary training, has been fundamentally reorganized in line with national security requirements. At the summit of the specialist military educational pyramid are three Military Lyceums, each in turn established on the basis of a former Soviet military institution.

The Lviv Military Lyceum emphasizes the role of the teaching staff in instilling in the cadets a sense of their Ukrainian heritage and loyalty to the Armed Forces. The Lvov Military Lyceum has another important responsibility: producing physical training instructors for the Armed Forces.

The two remaining Lyceums replace former military-political schools. The Donetsk Military Lyceum took over the Donets Higher Military Political School of Engineers and Signals Troops. On the basis of a much expanded program, it trains junior specialists. The Simferopol Military Lyceum trains junior military construction engineers, while military environmental specialists are trained at the Crimean Institute of Nature Conservation and Construction of Spas.

Reservist training presents a major headache for the UAF. Plans are being drawn to reorganize and tighten control on reservists. One preliminary step has already been forced on the Defense Ministry, namely the closure of almost half of the "military chairs" attached to higher schools, institutes, and state universities throughout Ukraine. This is in answer to calls by political

radicals and "democratic groups," most of whom were calling for a total ban on all reservist training on the campus. By mid-1993, the number of military chairs was to be cut from 73 to 43, some of which were to be relocated some distance from the campus. The statutory three- to four-year period of reservist training requirement for commissioning of former NCOs to the reserve rank of Junior Lieutenant (*Mladshiy lieutenant*), established in 1969, has been retained. [Ref. 106]

7. Security and Intelligence Services

No review of the new Ukrainian regime of military education would be complete without a brief reference to the future structure of training for security, counter-intelligence, and secret intelligence (*strategicheskaya razvedka*) officials.

Most senior officials of the former Ukrainian security and intelligence services, including many non-Ukrainians, continue to serve in the new state organs. There has, however, been a radical reassessment of training aimed at producing an efficient and dedicated national service, controlled by a highly professional senior elite. The former Higher School of the Ukrainian Internal Affairs Ministry has been reorganized to form the Academy of Ukrainian Internal Affairs, complete with a Military Faculty for students from the Armed Forces.

The most important change is the establishment of the Institute for Training Counter-Intelligence Personnel, under the control of the Ukrainian

Security Service (former Ukrainian KGB). The Institute has a staff of 50 officials and senior academics. The basic course for future Security Services (counter-intelligence and secret intelligence), Border Troops, and Armed Forces officers, lasts five years. The first students took an oath of loyalty on 30 August 1992. Commenting on the Institute, Major General Vasily Gorbatyuk, a 50-year old veteran of the Ukrainian KGB, now First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service, stressed that, apart from "learning the 'ins and outs' of our unique profession", in the course of the five-year program, students would devote much of their time to studying the constitution and legal restraints required to be observed by security officials during the tenure of their operations. [Ref. 107]

D. BASE FORCE

If military reform is implemented along the general lines of the conceptual plan and within the ceilings established by the Ukrainian Supreme Council and the CFE treaty, by the end of 1995, the Ukrainian armed forces and their equipment will consist approximately of the following strengths (declared strengths in 1992 are in parentheses): personnel: 450,000 (726,000, not including the paramilitary forces such as the national guard, internal troops, border troops or railroad troops); tanks: 4,080 (6,300); armed combat vehicles: 5,050 (6,170); artillery: 4,040 (3,080); antitank weapons: 6,000; SAM sites: 934; aircraft: 1,090 (1,380); combat helicopters: 240 (240); and ships: 277. By any account, it is a formidable force in Europe, the largest after that of Russia. But

these reforms will not be easy. There are a number of serious problems that the Ukrainian military leadership will have to solve before they can claim success [Ref. 108]. These dilemmas are mostly sociological in nature and are addressed in the following chapter.

VI. ETHNIC SECURITY MAP

The purpose of this section is to describe the complex ethnic situation in Ukraine while it was under Soviet rule and then show how the established "ethnic security map" has affected present day Ukraine's military and its loyalty to Ukraine. This chapter analyzes the pre-independence period and the "ethnic security map" of the SAF by focusing on the theoretical aspect of the ethnic factor using the works of N.F. Dreiszinger, R.A. Preston, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. It allows analysts to better understand the present ethnic dilemma's and sociological issues plaguing the UAF in an independent state.

Although this chapter studies the SAF and its techniques of integration, it is crucial for the reader to keep in mind what has been coerced onto Ukraine and its people for the last century. Focus is given to the UAF that is presently struggling to Ukrainianize its force. This force has been brought up in a closeted Soviet environment and indoctrinated with the Communist ideology and world outlook. It educated personnel to think as being the elite social strata of the Soviet (not national) society imbued with Russian military traditions and history.

A. DREIZINGER AND PRESTON MODELS APPLIED TO SAF

Most armed forces in the world today are multi-ethnic and are composed of men and women of different races or cultures, often speaking different languages or dialects. This has existed since ancient times. The immediate reason for this phenomenon was that, for the most part, rulers were bent on conquest armies which were often tools in which soldiers, and in some cases the entire armies of subject nations, were cajoled to serve. However, another fundamental reason for the existence of multi-ethnic armies in the past and the present is the fact that nations tended to be polyethnic. [Ref. 109] This equally applies to the composition of the SAF. In the case of the Soviet Union the SAF were made of several nationalities or racial groups. It was a force that was both multi-ethnic (meaning that it was composed of more than one cultural group of the same race) and multi-racial (it was also composed of personnel of asiatic features).

Furthermore, as Dreizinger and Preston mention in their essay, "Polyethnicity and Armed Forces," in some polyethnic armed forces the officer corps was made up of the members of the ethnic group (or groups) different from other ranks. This was very evident in the SAF. In the SAF, what complicated the difficult situation further was the fact that countries tended to use the "ethnic factor" in their armed forces for different purposes. These purposes were political rather than military. Therefore a polyethnic armed forces could be an instrument of ethnic segregation and/or oppression: it can

be used to enhance the social and political position of one ethnic group *vis-a-vis* another ethnic group. In the case of the SAF the Russians became the dominant ethnic group, which attempted to impose political order and structure over other groups within the military (*i.e.*, Ukrainians). At the same time, the ethnic factors in the SAF were used to appease a particular group (the Russians) and were used to promote national (ethnic - Russian) integrity and unity. [Ref. 110]

B. RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE STUDY

The ethnic factor in the SAF is the subject of Professor Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's study, which described the SAF which were truly multi-ethnic forces, reflecting the demographic situation of the USSR: Russians made up only one half of that country's population, while the other half was composed of close to a hundred ethnic groups. As a result, in the Soviet military numerous ethnic problems would have existed at greater levels, if the Soviet leadership would not have attempted to "russify" its forces in the way it attempted to.

One of the enduring characteristics of the Russian military both in Tsarist and post-revolutionary times, was the use of the armed forces as an instrument of societal integration, more precisely, as a means of imposing an official culture and world view upon Russia's various nationalities. Under tsarist rule this meant spreading the triad of Orthodox religion, political conservatism, and the Russian language. In the post-revolutionary era, Marxist theory and

Leninist political practice replaced the religious and political overtones of the earlier days; but promotion of the Russian language and culture continued. In the next chapter, focus will shift to the UAF and how it is attempting to reverse the process of "Sovietization" by countering the old ideology, the Russian language and culture, and the Russian military traditions by "Ukrainianizing" its forces, with its own democratic vision, its own language, history, culture and military tradition. It is a constant fight for the loyalty of the soldier to its state, by insuring that Ukraine's forces know where they came from and what they are fighting for. [Ref. 111]

Overall, the Russian's distrusted their nationalities and believed they needed to maintain their dominion over them. To maintain strong control they manipulated ethnic make-up of various branches of the Soviet military, to further their overall objectives. They further attempted to use Russian history, culture, tradition and language in order to create a common fabric, that would hold the forces together. This was done by attempting to stamp out ethnic diversity within its military. The SAF were seen as the "school of the nation." The conscripts were inculcated with a set of common Soviet values and behavioral patterns that maximized the forces' cohesion and combat readiness, while also endowing each soldier with a capability to transcend the parochial confines of his native environment and to lead socially useful civilian life following the service. In this task the management in the forces of the ethnic factor was a major significance. It was at the center of concern of the SAF's

organization and manpower distribution, and in the forefront of political-military training. [Ref. 112]

The ethnic mix of each conscript cohort reflected that of the country at large, but their distribution in the ranks fit an "ethnic security map" that favored the Russian element. In the 1980s the Russian's comprised approximately half of the Soviet population. The other half was made up of more than one hundred national groups, among whom were other Slavs (Ukrainians and Belorussians) and the rapidly expanding Moslem group. Although these other groups were represented in the armed forces they did not man key decision making roles or posts. Glass ceilings existed, in many areas, such as the General Staff, command positions in the strategic forces (nuclear, airborne or *spetsnatz* units). Such groups had limited access.

Many of these problems are presently being reversed in the UAF. Progress is difficult and will probably be slow, since many of its personnel have been productive members of the Soviet military, many of whom at the top positions are ethnic Russians.

C. ETHNIC COMPOSITION

There is a serious ethnic imbalance within the armed forces of Ukraine. Ethnic Russians make up approximately 90 percent of Ukraine's general officers; around 60 percent of field grade officers in the ground forces (the percentage is higher in the air force and navy); 53 percent of the Ukrainian General Staff. The situation is somewhat more favorable to ethnic Ukrainians

in the company grade officer ranks, especially as the Ukrainian military schools have begun to graduate cohorts of native commissioned officers and warrant officers. At the same time, the Ukrainian ministry of defense estimates that there are over 200,000 Ukrainian ethnic military personnel serving outside Ukraine, mostly in the armed forces of the Russian Federation, many of whom want to transfer to the UAF. The ethnic situation is still better in the enlisted ranks, as the new 18-month term of service provides for automatic and period turnover in personnel, thus making the enlisted ranks reflect the general ethnic ration in the Ukrainian society (which is 73 percent ethnic Ukrainian) [Ref. 113]. Since the ranks are filled with low quality conscripts who are easily drawn to crime and since the poorly paid military, is dominated by an officer corp that is primarily Russian, there is either a lack of interest or a resistance to "Ukrainianization." This was most evident when the ethnic Russians, who form a majority in many units resented the establishment of the Social Psychological Service which was to nationalize recruits.

According to the acting head of the defense Ministry's personnel directorate, Colonel Ivan Khomiak, as of August 1995, ethnic Ukrainians now constitute 59 percent of the UAF as opposed to 45 percent on 1993. He said that the percentage of ethnic Russians had dropped from 48 percent in 1993 to 37 percent, and added that five of the six new generals appointed in 1995 were also Ukrainian. He stressed, however, that Ukrainian citizenship and not ethnic origin was the major criterion in the formation of the UAF. [Ref. 114]

VII. SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES

This chapter builds on the material of the previous chapter and focuses on the present day re-education process ("Ukrainianization") that is ongoing in Ukraine and also addresses other sociological issues that are intertwined directly or indirectly with the ethnic issue. This chapter, in concert with the previous one, allows us to answer the question: "Are the UAF loyal to the Ukrainian state?"

Having made the decision to "nationalize" all armed forces located on the territory of Ukraine on the eve of its independence, the Ukrainian political and military leadership has, by the same token, inherited numerous problems that have a serious impact on morale, discipline, readiness and combat sustainability [Ref. 115]. The Chechen operation launched by Russia in December 1994 highlighted the crisis affecting the RAF. A similar crisis affecting the UAF appears to be as bad, if not worse. This situation reflects not only Ukraine's military inheritance but also the current socio-economic situation in the country as a whole. Without doubt, morale in the Ukrainian armed forces is at an all-time low. The number of cases where there has been a breach of regulations by servicemen in 1994 grew by 47 percent compared with the previous year while criminal proceedings increased by almost 50 percent. Not surprisingly, defense Minister Valery Shmarov has complained that the armed forces were "infested with bribery, corruption, and theft" [Ref. 116].

The decline in discipline in the armed forces has been blamed on the general economic malaise which has produced a large number of social problems, as well as low salaries and low prestige. Many officers are without housing in spite of the promise that the situation was to have been corrected by the construction of accommodation with funds received from the sale of surplus military equipment. Almost half of all suicides involve military officers, a rate which is growing because of poor standards of servicemen [Ref. 117]. Following are some of the salient problems they face and solutions they are employing to reverse the effects of being under Soviet control for so many years.

A. FORCE CONVERSION AND QUALITY OF LIFE

While the reduction of excess equipment as mandated by the CFE agreement has reportedly been proceeding in a relatively smooth manner, the task of reducing military manpower is almost daunting in magnitude. It is complicated by the commitment of the Ukrainian government to a somewhat generous entitlement and "safety net" programs. The latter calls for providing living quarters, retraining, job placement or social security for approximately 150,000 military officers and noncommissioned officers who are slated to be, or are already deactivated and placed in a reserve status or retired prior to 1995 [Ref. 118]. Defense Minister Shmarov admitted that 72,000 service personnel have no housing [Ref. 119].

Pay frequently does not arrive and/or is insufficient to cover basic requirements. In February 1994, former Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky flew with a group of officers from the Central Staff to the 28th All-Arms Division based near Odessa after the officer corps went on strike following repeated and prolonged delays in the payment of their salaries. Similar protests took place at the Ivano-Frankivsk air base and, in November 1994, a rally of servicemen in Kiev demanded better social protection and housing for officers. [Ref. 120]

Morale is low and draft evasion consequently high. Most young people aspire to careers in business or in the proliferating Mafia gangs. The new entrepreneurs and Mafia gangs are the focus of the awe and aspiration of Ukraine's young. Although the army, together with the clergy, is Ukraine's most respected institution, it is also one of the least understood. Ukrainian officers are witnessing the erosion of the prestige and benefits which once attracted them to their profession. During the winter of 1993-1994, they frequently remained unpaid from one month to the next. When they did receive their pay, they were forced to choose whether to spend it on heating, rent, food, or clothing, but seldom could they afford more than one of these options. Officers face chronic housing problems: the returnees from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union swelled the demand for housing above the limit of what could be supplied. [Ref. 121]

These dilemmas considerably slow the process of force reduction and constrain military reforms. More significantly, they impart a sense of insecurity among the officers who are unsure of their future, and have a deleterious effect

on the morale and personal interest of these officers and attention to their job assignment.

Some officers have formed protective, albeit technically illegal, associations or unions to lobby for their personal welfare and social protection. Thus far, over 90 percent of the members of the Ukraine's armed forces have reportedly sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian state. But how many did so out of a deep sense of loyalty rather than sheer socio-economic or opportunistic considerations is almost impossible to determine. The present ongoing serious economic downturn in Ukraine can only exacerbate the low morale among the Ukrainian military and bring into question the degree of their loyalty to Ukraine in time of a crisis. [Ref. 122]

B. LANGUAGE OF COMMAND

Closely related to the issue of the ethnic makeup of the Ukrainian armed forces is the language of command and communication as one of the legacies from the Soviet period. Russian was the language of command and communication within the Soviet armed forces from their origin, making it a powerful tool of Russification. This was abetted by an intensive Russification program in the society at large, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. This condition not only prevented the development of non-Russian military and technical terminology, but it also hindered the very use of native language in the armed forces. [Ref. 123]

Although the Ukrainian government has been careful to define citizenship based on residency and not ethnicity, Ukrainian national sentiment is likely to grow as economic conditions remain poor. The nationalist card will be an easy and effective one for politicians to play [Ref. 124]. Increasing the ethnic Ukrainian component of the officer corps by removing ethnic Russians will be an easy way to cater to nationalist sentiments. One of the strongest paths towards greater Ukrainianization will be to make Ukrainian the official language of government institutions, including the armed forces [Ref. 125]. In accordance with the Ukrainian Law on Languages, former President Morozov issued an order mandating the gradual transition to Ukrainian in the armed forces. The Law on Languages called for a three- to five-year period for employees of state institutions to learn Ukrainian, beginning in 1990. This policy naturally favored Ukrainians, although those Russians who spoke or learned Ukrainian would be able to maintain their positions.

The introduction of Ukrainian as the official language met with great difficulties and opposition in the Army in which 35 percent are native Russian speakers. Some 30 percent of Ukrainians cannot speak their native language, not to mention sizeable groups of Belorussians and Poles, and a handful of Romanians. Whereas great strides had been made in establishing Ukrainian as the "official language on the drill square and on exercise," mastering military terminology was proving problematic [Ref. 126]. It will be some time before the current effort at introducing Ukrainian as the language of command and

communications into the armed forces becomes a reality [Ref. 127]. Until then, it will remain one of the causes of internal dissonance within the armed forces.

C. REEDUCATION PROGRAM

Aside from such factors as one's military career, socio-economic well-being and morale within the Ukrainian military, another determinant of loyalty is ideology. All officers in the senior ranks now serving in the Ukrainian armed forces were brought up in a closeted Soviet environment and indoctrinated with the communist ideology and world outlook. They were taught to think as being the elite social strata of the Soviet (not national) society and were imbued with Russian military tradition and history. This was a socio-psychological package in which there was no room for any reference to the Ukrainian military tradition or history prior to 1917. Suddenly, after August 1991, these officers, many disoriented by the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union, found themselves in the Ukrainian national armed forces and were being asked to swear allegiance to a new state that only months before they could not even imagine. As a result, the Ukrainian military leadership has been faced with a giant and very sensitive task - political re-education of its inherited officer corps.

The Ukrainian Parliament abolished the former Soviet political officer structure in the armed forces and adopted a law on the socio-psychological "reeducation" of the Ukrainian military. A new reeducational structure, called the "Socio-Psychological Service," has been established throughout the armed forces (down to company level). It is designed to impart a Ukrainian national

security identity by introducing the basic tenets of Ukrainian history, language and military tradition, and to promote democratization of the armed forces. This effort understandably has created some tension within the armed forces. [Ref. 128] As mentioned earlier, the process of "Ukrainianization" of the armed forces reflects the state-wide debate over the proper relationship of the Ukrainian language and culture to its Russian equivalent. As with the state as a whole, compromises have been reached and serious conflicts avoided. The most contentious change within the armed forces was the replacement of Marxist-Leninist political education with Ukrainian linguistic and cultural education.

The policy of greater Ukrainianization of the officer corps has created resentment among many ethnic Russians who swore allegiance to Ukraine due to professional and social guarantees made by the government. Many Russian officers see themselves as the victims of discrimination and broken promises. Such a development may in the future increase tensions both between the two nationalities inside Ukraine (Ukraine's population is 22 percent ethnic Russian, with much higher concentrations in certain areas - the Crimea, for example, is 67 percent Russian) and between the Ukrainian and Russian governments. [Ref. 129]

Aside from ideological re-education, programs now exist that attempt to train military retirees for civilian duty. The European Commission, together with Germany, the United Kingdom and the Soros Foundation, are establishing systems for the retraining of retired and discharged officers so that these

individuals can go into civilian society with something practical to offer. Training is based on small business management and specific trades such as vehicle or electrical repair. The combined financial contribution from the West runs to many millions of dollars. If the reduction of the armed forces to a strength of 250,000 is to be completed without the risk of destabilizing protest, then the Ukrainian government, together with its Western and CIS partners, must ensure that the esprit de corps of the officer corps is not further eroded. [Ref. 130]

D. UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL AND MILITARY TRADITIONS

Ukrainian national historical and military traditions have been an important tool for attempting to mold former Soviet forces in Ukraine into the UAF. The UAF attempted to introduce these traditions through the work of the SPS, specialized courses and lectures, the designation of uniforms and insignias, and perhaps most importantly, the military press. However, Ukrainian national symbols have met considerable resistance from the conservative elements within the military and presumably, from the largely Russian officer corp.

The hesitancy of the UAF to break the resistance to "Ukrainianization" is due not only to the entrenchment of the old guard within the military, but also to other factors. While some Ukrainian traditions - the Cossack, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) - have gained general acceptance, others - the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) and the Waffen-SS Galician Division of the

World War II period - have generated considerable controversy and regional divisiveness. Moreover, Ukrainians seem to be willing to accept national symbols from the more distant past, but have not even fully discussed the more recent Soviet experience. There is almost a conspiracy of silence about Soviet Ukrainian period, because most Ukrainians are very well aware that independence was achieved when a faction of the communists decided to support this nationalist goal. Thus, national symbols, once completely forbidden, are now permitted and even encouraged as long as they do not challenge or offend the ex-communists, who are still relatively strong in Ukraine. Moreover, imperial and Soviet rule has resulted in widespread acceptance of a Russian and Soviet view of history even among Ukrainians. A change in outlook would require an extensive educational campaign that neither the government nor the military is prepared to undertake at this time.

[Ref. 131]

E. INSIGNIAS, FORMS OF ADDRESS AND COMMEMORATIONS

Another way to de-Russify and de-Sovietize the armed forces has been to replace Soviet and Russian military terms and symbols with traditional Ukrainian ones. The SPS has cautiously drawn attention to what is Ukrainian nomenclature and what is intrinsically Russian. Instructors have routinely contributed articles for the military press on Ukrainian military traditions and symbols, and have participated actively in the cultural clubs that have sprung up spontaneously within the military. The link with the pre-Soviet Ukrainian

past is most important. The oath of allegiance, "I pledge to defend the Ukrainian State," is said to have precedence in practice as long as the 18th century. Proposals for insignias and symbols for the UAF have tended to evoke those that were standard for the UNR Army, with emphasis on the trident, the most common non-Soviet national symbol, which the Ukrainian parliament adopted for use as the state emblem of Ukraine. With regard to the uniform of the UAF, one proposal suggests that it be modelled on that of NATO, and that insignias of *Kievan Rus'* and the Cossack period be added. In 1993 the military announced that its official flag would be blue and yellow, the traditional national colors, on which would be inscribed the words, "*Za Ukrainu, za yiyi vail*" ("For Ukraine and Its Freedom"), taken from a popular Western Ukrainian military song of the UNR period, while a special UAF banner would employ the Zaporizhian Cossack crimson colors and patterns. Insignias of the *Kievan Rus'* and Cossack periods have been suggested for the army's uniform. The triumph of the trident in the armed services finally came in the late summer of 1993, when Defense Minister Konstantyn Morozov issued instructions to all units of the UAF to paint over all red stars and other Soviet insignias on vehicles with the Ukrainian trident and blue and yellow strips. [Ref. 132]

F. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The growing chorus of Ukrainian demands for separate armed forces and hostility towards all-Union structures undoubtedly played a role in the disintegration of the former Soviet armed forces, as most visibly seen in their

failure to act to defend the *coup d'etat* in August 1991. The Ukrainian drive to establish separate armed forces between mid 1991 and mid 1992 was a highly popular move, backed by all of Ukraine's political parties and civic groups. The initially elected President and Parliament banned the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) between August 1991 - October 1993). [Ref. 133]

The nationalization of all Soviet conventional forces on Ukrainian territory was undertaken relatively quickly and without conflict (with the exception of the Black Sea Fleet). It was successful due to several reasons: a lack of ethnic conflicts in the republic (unlike in Moldova or Trans Caucasia), a large number of Ukrainian officers (unlike most other former Soviet republics apart from Russia), a willingness of Russian or Belorussian officers to take the loyalty oath of a fellow Slavic republic and the removal of the CPU from control of the military. [Ref. 134]

Civil-Military Relations have since become politicized in Ukraine. A poll shows that approximately 70 percent of military officers often think of political problems - only enterprise directors have a higher figure [Ref. 135]. The armed forces also have the highest public support of any state institution at 69 percent (only the Church is a close second). Approximately 65 percent of Ukrainians believe that the only force capable of guaranteeing law and order are the armed forces (reflecting the low public status of the militia), while 89 percent of officers believe that their main function is to protect the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state [Ref. 136] (in comparison to only nine percent of the population who believe that this should be a first priority of the state) [Ref. 137].

Overall, the role of the Ukrainian armed forces has remained the defense of the state's independence. This has required the need to imbue the armed forces with the "ideology of statehood" as the "only priority and object of defense against internal and external enemies." That an independent state cannot exist without its own armed forces is a fact widely accepted within Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian military, in comparison to Russian armed forces, are therefore more apolitical [Ref. 138]. At the same time, nearly 54 percent believed that a violent conflict similar to that which took place in Moscow in September-October 1993 could occur in Ukraine [Ref. 139].

Departisation of the armed forces, which in 1992 was primarily directed against the communists, was openly stated by Ukrainian leaders as a necessity. But, at the same time, the military cannot become depoliticized: "the army cannot be on the sidelines of processes which are taking place in the country, remaining a passive observer of conflict situations" [Ref. 140]. In the event of domestic or external conflict, the military should stand on the side of the constitutional authorities and state interests - not the interests of political forces. Colonel Vitaliy Chechylo, a leading military author, states that this would be best achieved by civilian control of the Ministry of Defense. This did indeed occur when Valeriy Shmarov was selected as the first civilian Minister of Defense in 1994. "To attempt to achieve the complete depoliticization of the army is not possible, but it is imperative that it be fully departed." If the armed forces were to become depoliticized they could begin to act as an independent force with their own political agenda. [Ref. 141]

It has been difficult to separate the armed forces from the political campaigns and debates raging across Ukraine in Spring 1994. At nearly half of the voting districts in the Carpathian military districts, both civilians and military servicemen were voting together. In addition, the military authorities were tasked with preventing unsanctioned election speeches by candidates [Ref. 142]. At a meeting of the Ministry of Defense collegium on 29 April 1994, General-Major Volodymyr Petenko, presidential military adviser, asked the generals who were present to collect signatures within the armed forces in support of Leonid Kravchuk to ensure his place in the presidential elections on 26 June (candidates required 100,000 signatures to be registered). Even though there were six other presidential candidates, the military support for Kravchuk did not work out and Leonid Kuchma became the new President of Ukraine [Ref. 143].

G. CONCLUSION

The deteriorating economic situation in the country, social deprivations (lack of housing and skyrocketing inflation) and career uncertainty born of prospects of *en masse* separation from the service have all had their impact on the morale and commitment of officers, especially those with families. The situation in the enlisted ranks is somewhat better. The reporting call-up rate at recruiting centers has been relatively adequate. Military discipline, however, has been somewhat lax. The tradition of *dedovshchina* (barrack hazing), an often brutal and widespread practice in the former Soviet armed forces, has not

yet been completely eradicated. As a result, the rate of desertion and absences without leave, especially in the ground forces, has been relatively high. [Ref. 144]

This leads us to the crucial question: "Are the UAF loyal to the Ukrainian state?" The Ukrainization of the UAF, like so many issues in Ukraine, is at a crossroads. Although the UAF has inherited an "ethnic security map" of the former Soviet Union, it has made some progress in reversing its effects. This problem is being rectified primarily by allowing ethnic Ukrainians to higher decision making posts in the military through equal competition based on citizenship rather than on ethnicity. Ukraine has successfully waged a reeducation campaign to educate the officer corp and its troops through various programs that would make them better "Ukrainian" soldiers. Even though additional work is still required to make the UAF more patriotic, they are generally loyal to the Ukrainian state and its people.

VIII. ARE THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO NEIGHBORING INCURSIONS?

It is difficult to evaluate the military capability of the Ukrainian armed forces (namely the army and air force, since the navy is still in the formation stage) at a time of transition and radical reforms because there is a partiality of sufficient data and information. This chapter will first look at the budgetary problems facing the UAF and then will apply four major components of military capability - force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability - to the Ukrainian armed forces as a frame of reference. This analysis yields incomplete and mixed results.

A. BUDGETARY PROBLEMS

As of February 1994, only ten percent of the required funds for the armed forces had been allocated, according to the then head of the Economic-Financial Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, General Ivan Shtopenko. The Ministry of Defense had asked for \$1.8 billion US (63.7 trillion *karbovanets*) but was allocated only a fraction of this figure. On 6 April 1995, the Ukrainian Parliament voted in favor of its first real budget in order to qualify for an IMF stabilization loan of over \$1.5 billion US, which was essential for President Kuchma's reform program. As a result, expenditure was reduced by four percent and the largest cut was made in the armed forces. Total defense expenditure this year will be only \$757 million US (106 trillion *karbovanets*)

of which the army will receive \$657 million US . (Appendix M - Military budget spending as a percentage of GDP) This represents only 4.3 percent of Ukraine's total budget, compared with 21.3 percent of Russia's total budget spent on the military. [Ref. 145]

All branches of the security forces have been hit by the new budgetary cuts. The priority allocation within the budget will be for internal security forces - National Guard, Ministry of Interior Internal Troops and Convoy Troops, *Berkut* riot police, *Militia Spetznaz* and the State Protection Service - in contrast to the regular armed forces. The greatest cuts would be to the Security Service, the State Customs Committee and the Border troops, according to Anatoliy Kovtun, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Budget Affairs. The collegium of the State Borders (*Derzhkomkordon*) has already complained that the sum allocated to maintain border troops in 1995 only covered 44 percent of their real needs. The collegium would, therefore, determine priorities in administering the funds such as cash payments, and the provision of goods and foodstuffs to border guards. The shortage of funds does not, however, alter Ukraine's steadfast opposition to the joint protection of CIS external borders, but it did limit the ability to equip the new posts on the border with Russia, which were only installed in early 1993. [Ref. 146]

The Defense Minister has complained that the budget allocation for 1995 was insufficient to allow for even elementary modernization of weapons and equipment and he expressed fear that the armed forces "will become unfit for action." "We have been unable to pay sufficient attention to scientific trends

and purchase new weaponry," he claimed. "Funds are barely sufficient to maintain the armed forces, let alone develop them. If we continue to act in this way, we risk crossing a Rubicon beyond which the negative processes now under way will be irreversible." Defense Minister Shmarov has calculated that 141.1 trillion *karbovanets* are required to finance all the needs of the armed forces.

The lack of money has already lead to a reduction of 65,000 personnel and the proposed sale of military installations and land. But, as Ukrainian military commentators have pointed out, the reduction in the number of officers leads to other costs, such as housing. The most successful branch of the armed forces which has been able to obtain additional sources of funding is transportation aviation. It received \$1.5 million US in 1994, and another \$3 million US is owed by civilian airlines. Foodstuffs are provided free of charge by some regions to the Ukrainian navy while others have agreed to purchase apartments for naval officers. The length of conscription may be reduced from two years to 18 months. [Ref. 147]

The current head of the Financial-Economic Directorate, Major General Hryhorii Kucharskyi, has stated that while the armed forces received 34 percent of their financial needs in 1993-1994, they currently receive only 28 percent. In 1995, the budget allocation would be sufficient only for 16.9 percent of armed forces requirements. This would only cover the most basic areas, such as foodstuffs, salaries and communal utilities. Military reform would be

severely harmed as only 5-12 percent of the allocated funds would be available for training and new technology. [Ref. 148]

B. FORCE STRUCTURE

Presently, the UAF are suffering a shortage of manpower mainly due to the very high numbers being granted deferment from compulsory service. These deferments are granted to many candidates who have either medical problems or are physically unable to perform military service. In addition, corruption has allowed many parents to either pay off the recruiting boards or doctors in order to falsify medical status. The length of the period of compulsory service has therefore been extended from eighteen months to two years.

Both Ukraine and Russia are including certain naval air and coastal defense forces in their data returns regarding personnel reductions to the CFE Treaty. The reorganization of the Army has continued with the three military districts being replaced by two operational commands, Western and Southern. Each has three corps. The artillery corps has been disbanded, four motor rifle divisions have been converted to mechanized divisions, two have been given reserve status and four have been disbanded. Two more mechanized brigades have been created and the formation of the air-mobile division, which comprises one airborne and one air mobile brigades and one artillery regiment, has been completed. Plans are to reduce the manpower strength of the armed forces to some 450,000 by the end of 1995. [Ref. 149]

Overall, the force structure being implemented over the next three to five years seems to be adequate for Ukraine's needs. The planning provides for reasonable sufficiency of forces, especially ground forces, with a good mix of units by type and emphasis on mobility and maneuverability. By abolishing the former Soviet operational armies and making the corps the primary command and control maneuver organization and by increasing the number of independent brigades, the Ukrainian force planners seem to favor smaller and lighter units that will permit them to form force packages to meet specific military operational requirements. These units will be fully manned and combat capable, and in contrast to former Soviet force structure policies, current Ukrainian plans do not call for any cadre or partially manned units. By reducing the tank divisions from four to one by 1999, two artillery divisions and three brigades to nine artillery brigades and by converting the airborne units into airmobile forces, the Ukrainian military planners seem to stress defensive rather than offensive combat or force-projection capability of their ground forces. The projected conversion of present motorized rifle divisions and brigades will afford them greater mobility and maneuverability. The ability of the Ukrainian armed forces to transition to wartime operations, however, is hard to estimate at this time. The present forces constitute a large pool of trained manpower. There is an adequate force reconstitution capability. The former Soviet mobilization structure, *commissariats*, is still basically intact. Ukraine has a pool of one-million men with military service within the last five

years, which will permit the Ukrainian defense leadership to generate new forces to meet possible future major military threats. [Ref. 150]

C. MODERNIZATION

The Ukrainian military establishment inherited more than enough quality weapons systems and parts from the Soviet Union. Ukraine contains some 15 percent of the former Soviet defense industrial and military research and development facilities and is the second-largest producer of military weapons and equipment after Russia among the successor states. It can assemble all major categories of military equipment, and some of its facilities have unique capabilities (such as shipbuilding, missile production and assembly). However, as a result of deliberate manufacturing interdependence practiced in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine depends on Russia for many components and subassemblies. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the arduous process of economic reform in Ukraine have resulted in a hiatus in force modernization, as the defense industry suffered from unavoidable disruption in research, development, production and fielding of new systems. Given time, however, the Ukrainian defense establishment has the potential for remedying these shortfalls by focusing on its own production capability, for which it has material resources and trained manpower. [Ref. 151]

D. READINESS

Force readiness is a sum total of many elements such as quality of training, deployability, unit cohesion and morale. There is no doubt that the Ukrainian military establishment inherited a sufficient number of trained, qualified and well-equipped forces. Many of its officers and men have had combat experience in Afghanistan, and a battalion-size contingent performing a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia (already in its third rotation) is providing the Ukrainian ground forces with additional, albeit limited experience under combat conditions. The Ukrainian armed forces have excellent training bases and more than enough military schools. But the forces are in the process of a major down-sizing and restructuring under conditions of a deteriorating national economy, and this is bound to affect their readiness for the near term.

[Ref. 152]

Although Ukraine is second to Russia in military fuel storage capacity and has large untouched strategic fuel reserves, the current serious operational fuel shortage has constrained normal military training in both the army and the air force. No division-size unit field training has been conducted by the Ukrainian ground forces since their creation in 1991, although the number of command post exercises has increased. The ground army and the air force have weak logistic infrastructures. There is a shortage of spare parts and fuel in the forces, yet few funds are available for new equipment or research. In early 1994, the air force admitted that one-third of the country's aircraft stock

was unserviceable. Repair was impossible because there was not enough fuel to check engines and this led to the suspension of combat training. In early 1993, each air force regiment had 14 combat crews but this had dropped to only four a year later. Hence, there is widespread fear that the lack of training will soon make Ukrainian pilots incapable of flying. Currently, pilots and tank drivers receive only 20-30 percent of the required minimum training levels, as set by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. In addition, not a single exercise at divisional level has been held since the inception of the Ukrainian armed forces in late 1991. The chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, recently summed up that "the UAF's weakest point is that they are turning into an army of theoreticians." [Ref. 153]

The impact of the crisis can be gauged within the former Soviet 98th Airborne Division based in Bolgrad in southwestern Ukraine. The base now forms the core of Ukraine's 1st Airborne Division which has earned itself the reputation of the "most efficient and best trained" formation in the UAF. The major problem in the formation is low pay, especially when compared with the counterparts in Russia. For each parachute jump, the troops receive two percent of the official minimum, pay plus other bonuses, depending on length of service and number of previous jumps. In Russia, a payment of two percent is also paid for each jump, but this is not based on minimum pay, rather on that of a senior officer. [Ref. 154]

While reporting for semiannual military call-ups has been relatively adequate in Ukraine, the ratio of deferments seems to be excessively high (in

the fall 1993 call-up, two-thirds of all eligible men received some form of deferment). In addition, reported no-shows and desertion rates are still high. The military discipline in the armed forces, seriously impaired by the dissolution of the Soviet army, has not yet been fully restored. The relocation and new basing of restructured ground forces has just begun, which for the near term will affect their deployability in the event of a military threat on Ukraine's borders. These shortcomings notwithstanding, Ukraine does have a highly trained military officer corps that in time should be able to forge a well-trained and ready force. [Ref. 155]

E. SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability implies that a military force can engage an aggressor in armed conflict over a "long period" by maintaining sound tactical and logistical control over the battlefield. This term assumes that the command and control elements have enough synchronization, firepower and supporting resources to find, fix and destroy the enemy before reaching a culminating point. The phrase "long period" signifies the duration that is required to overwhelm your opponent.

Given the shortcomings discussed under the categories above, the sustainability of Ukrainian armed forces can be rated as fair to poor. This condition will persist until a sufficient number of operational maneuver units and their combat service support elements are recognized, reequipped and trained as collectives. The army and the air force need to rebuild their

logistical infrastructures to be able to field and sustain their forces in a high-intensity conflict. In their present state the Ukrainian armed forces could sustain short-term combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential exists for the Ukrainian army to develop war fighting capability to deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military power. It can defend its western borders and for the near term at least, provide a credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from Russia. This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other components of military capability - force structure, readiness and modernization - are brought to projected levels [Ref. 156]. The economic factors at this time seem to hamper quick progress in military reforms. However, with time, as the economy stabilizes and further ties with western countries develop, additional funding will become available for improving the force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability of the UAF.

IX. CONCLUSION

As Ukraine's political scenario has developed, the requirements of Kiyv for the Ukrainian armed forces have become clear within the comparatively brief space of four years. Ukraine must be able to protect its northern and eastern borders in order to deter aggression from what many in Kiev still see as the possibility of a resurgent imperialist government to the north and east. Ukraine must be able to protect its shipping and ports in the Black Sea area. It must be able to maintain internal order during the deepening economic crisis. It must be able to respond, as it has done in the former Yugoslavia for the last two years, to the need for peacekeeping in the region, and it must be able to integrate with its allies and partners in both the CIS and NATO to that end.

Ukraine has made slow but steady progress towards the transformation of its armed forces from the gigantic but useless force inherited from the Soviet Union. Ukraine's strategic position in Europe is unenviable, with invasion and conquest the unifying features of its history. There can be no doubt that Ukraine requires a flexible, mobile and modern defense capability, or that the process of achieving that aim will continue to be slowed by economic and political difficulties. Ukraine's strong desire for security guarantees from the West comes from a realistic appraisal of its situation, but that very situation requires a circumspect reaction from the West which many politicians and officers in Ukraine resent and mistrust. There are signs, however, that Ukraine's security thinking and policy are rapidly maturing. NATO appears to

have been impressed by Ukraine's enthusiastic embrace of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and there can be little doubt from the Kiev perspective that this enthusiasm is genuine. I view the future for Ukraine's transformation of its armed forces and, correspondingly, the transformation of Ukraine's place in Europe's security architecture, with cautious optimism.

Despite funding constraints, and reorganizational and the sociological dilemmas that plague the Ukrainian armed forces, it has made some progress within the last four years. This progress has been made primarily in the areas of personnel reductions, force restructuring and "Ukrainianization" of its officer corps. Although numerous problems impact on the efficiency of Ukraine's military, one should observe the security situation as objectively as possible, which means taking into consideration the relative capability of the most likely enemy - Russia. From this perspective, although Russia is militarily stronger than Ukraine, it too possesses a variety of its own problems. All the problems that are present in the UAF also exist in the RAF. The RAF forces have been demoralized and disrupted, negatively impacting on their performance. This is magnified by the unprofessional and brutal war in Chechnya. Studies and analysis show that the Russian troops lacked the desire and will to fight, that they lacked training required to conduct decentralized combined operations and that they suffered in command, control and communication (C3) when synchronizing the battlefield. Such weaknesses were wisely exploited by the largely outnumbered Chechen rebels [Ref. 157]. A similar approach may be used by the UAF, if an appropriate defense concept is developed. This would

require that the UAF employ the Pripiat Marshes and the Dnieper River to its advantage as geographical points of defense in order to bog down and wear away the enemy through delaying decentralized actions. This leads to the logical conclusion that if the RAF experienced problems with the Chechens, there is no reason why they would attempt to target a force that is even more numerically superior and one that attempts to use attritional defense strategy to inflict heavy casualties on the Russian forces. To make such logic a reality, it is crucial that Ukraine diplomatically articulate such a message, leaving no doubts for the Russian policy maker. Deterrence is Ukraine's best weapon against Russia. It may be reinforced by initially focusing on diplomatic efforts as a means to a resolution of tensions, which it already has done through the wording in its military doctrine. A comprehensive defense concept must be developed and openly laid out, so that potential enemies understand that interference in Ukraine's sovereignty would mean heavy casualty rates, thereby forcing the enemy to question their own will.

In this net assessment of Ukraine's military, Chapter II focused on the years, 1989-1991. During this period, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, crucial events led to the legal basis for Ukraine's national security. Ukraine's endeavors to gain command of the military forces located within its boundaries were traced to four prominent events: the Declaration of Sovereignty, the August coup, the appointment of a Ukrainian Prime Minister and the oath of allegiance. This chapter showed how the hierarchy of obedience reversed in Ukraine, when the link joining the Soviet Union to the military forces in

Ukraine was severed and when a Ukrainian military chain of command was established. The process was later taken one step further when Ukraine turned the Soviet officer corps situated in Ukraine into a Ukrainian officer corps. From 1990-1992, the Soviet military's hierarchy of obedience disintegrated in Ukraine and a new Ukrainian one took its place.

Chapter III, described the Ukrainian Military Doctrine in order to assist researchers and policy makers in better comprehending Ukraine's military and its intentions. This would allow them to better make assessments in the future on how these forces may be employed. Initially, this chapter summarized the ratified version of the Ukrainian Military Doctrine and later analyzed the document. This chapter stressed that Ukraine's military doctrine is defensive in nature, based on the principles of nonintervention, respect for the integrity of national borders and national independence of other states, and rejects the idea of using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. It studied the military-political, military-technical, and military-economic aspects of the doctrine. Overall, the military doctrine emphasizes the fundamental law of "reasonable defense sufficiency" in regulating the size and types of forces and the quantity and quality of conventional weapons and systems. It mentions a political commitment to a non-nuclear status and focuses on developing a modern, well-trained, well-armed and highly mobile force, with a special emphasis on precision weapons, intelligence and electronic warfare capability, air and space defense and sufficient air and sea power. To attain all this, it calls for the development and maintenance of a modern and economically

rational national defense industrial base. Although Ukraine possesses a military doctrine, it lacks temporal and spatial characteristics. It lacks temporal characteristics, since it is unclear whether today's realities or tasks for the future are meant. Also, a spatial characteristic is absent in the Doctrine, since the priorities and forms of military cooperation with other countries have still not been determined. Another paradox of this doctrine is that it lacks a general concept of military reforms. Since it does not reflect existing realities of the developing world and the European situation many Ukrainian policy makers and military leaders do not take the military doctrine seriously. Due to these problems it is not a document which allows policy makers to determine main directions of Ukrainian military policy. This in turn makes it difficult for Ukraine to create stable and legal relations with other countries.

Chapter IV focused on the force structure and levels of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, by discussing the CFE ceilings for Ukraine and the present declared strengths. This chapter argued that the problem of the UAF in the first three years of existence stemmed from two main sources: the failure to estimate correctly the effort and cost involved in reforming the armed forces; and opinions varied regarding what "reasonable defense sufficiency" meant in terms of technology and strength of the armed forces. To better understand the force levels and structure of the UAF this chapter reviewed the specifics as they apply to the Main (General) Staff, the army, the air force and the navy (Black Sea Fleet). Ukraine has reduced the number of men under arms by at least 200,000 over the last three years. Current estimates put the number of service

men at approximately 450,000. The country's Defense Doctrine sets a target of 250,000, and few Ukrainian servicemen or politicians now contest this figure. The eventual aim is to establish a professional armed services. This process will take some time.

Chapter V discussed the strategic and operational factors (force levels, structure, potential application and education) impacting on the UAF. It included a net assessment of Ukraine's nuclear status, Ukraine's current military defense strategy options, the restructured military education system that will frame the future forces, and finally, the latest base force figures (1995) compared to the initial declared strengths in 1992. This assessment showed that although reform has begun in many areas, more changes are required before the UAF become a professional force.

Chapter VI described the complex ethnic situation in Ukraine while it was under Soviet rule and then showed how the established "ethnic security map" has affected present day Ukraine and its military, by creating ethnic imbalance within the armed forces. Contents focused on the theoretical aspect of the ethnic issue, by using the works of N.F. Dreiszinger, R.A. Preston, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. This chapter showed how glass ceilings in the SAF prevented minorities, like the Ukrainians, from attaining high decision making posts within the military infrastructure, and discussed the overall "russification" process which attempted to strip the minorities of their culture, traditions and customs. This was all done at the expense of minorities like the Ukrainians, so that Russian can become the dominant ethnic group.

Chapter VII laid out the sociological issues plaguing the UAF, and the negative impact they have on morale, discipline, readiness and combat sustainability. Subjects discussed included the slow force conversion process and the poor quality of life; the language of command and the fight to reestablish the Ukrainian language within the fighting forces; the re-education program that is attempting to "Ukrainianize" the officer corps; and the civil-military relationship that at this time is good. Although the UAF has inherited an "ethnic security map" of the former Soviet Union, it has made some progress in reversing its effects. Ukraine has successfully waged a reeducation campaign to educate the officer corp and its troops through various programs that would make them better "Ukrainian" soldiers. Even though additional work is still required to make the UAF more patriotic, they are generally loyal to the Ukrainian state and its people.

Chapter VIII focused on military capabilities of the UAF and answered the main puzzle question: "Are the UAF a potent and credible deterrent to neighboring incursions?" This chapter initially addressed the budgetary problems facing the UAF and then applied four major components of military capability - force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability - to the UAF as a frame of reference. The findings of this research is that the UAF can sustain short-term combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential is there for the Ukrainian army to develop fighting capability to deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military power. It can defend its western borders and for the near term at least, provide

a credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from Russia. This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other components of military capability - force structure, readiness and modernization - are brought to projected levels. The economic factors at this time seem to hamper quick progress in military reforms.

Although the Ukrainian armed forces presently have numerous problems, if one studies the relative problems in the RAF, it is possible to state that the UAF do act as a deterrent against a potential incursion from the east. However, this deterrent presently is not as potent or credible as the Ukrainian Parliament would like it to be. With time, it can develop into a more formidable force structure that is modern, combat ready, which possesses sustainability.

APPENDIX A. ABSTRACT FROM UKRAINE'S DECLARATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

IX. External and Internal Security

The Ukrainian SSR has the right to its own armed forces. The Ukrainian SSR has its own troops of the interior and bodies of state security, subordinate to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. The Ukrainian SSR determines the order of military service by the citizens of the republic. Citizens of Ukraine carry out their military service on the territory of the republic as a rule, and are not supposed to be used for military purposes outside the republic without the consent of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. The Ukrainian Soviet solemnly proclaims its wish to become in the future a neutral state, which does not participate in military blocs, and follows three non-nuclear principles: not to acquire, produce, or purchase any kind of nuclear weapons.

[Kiev International Service, 17 July 1990, translated in FBIS, 19 July 1990, page 91]

APPENDIX B. UKRAINE'S MILITARY OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, (name), upon entering military service, solemnly swear to the people of Ukraine to always be faithful and devoted to them, to conscientiously and honestly fulfill military duties, the orders of commanders, steadfastly uphold the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, safeguarding state and military secrets.

I swear to defend the Ukrainian state, firmly stand for her freedom and independence.

I swear to never betray the people of Ukraine.

[*Narodnaia armiia*, 4 January 1992, page 1]

APPENDIX C. MILITARY DOCTRINE OF UKRAINE

1. The Doctrine was approved by the Parliament on 19 October 1993. The Doctrine has three sections and 8 subsections. In the first section, "Military and Political Aspects" the following subsections are included:

- Military and political purposes of Ukraine and international priorities in ensuring national security.
- Causes of military unsafety. Ukraine's attitude to war.
- Attitude of Ukraine to nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

2. In the second section "Military and Technical Aspects" the following subsections are included:

- Basic ways to ensure military security.
- Tasks of Armed Forces and principles of their construction.
- Training Armed Forces for defense against aggression.

3. In the third section "Military and Economic Aspects" the following subsections are included:

- The purpose and principle of military economic policy.
- Preparation of the state and the population to the defense.

4. The Military Doctrine of Ukraine declares universally recognized principles and norms of international law and first of all those fixed in the UN Charter, Helsinki Concluding Act and the documents of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Among the detailed principles we emphasize the following:

- It is against allocation of foreign armies on Ukrainian territory.
- The doctrine forbids to use Ukrainian own armed forces to solve political problems on Ukrainian territory.
- Exclude its unilateral complete disarmament.
- Promote creation of reliable international mechanisms and all-Europe structure of safety on bilateral, regional and global levels with the purposes of enforcement of confidence and partnership based on principles of mutual understanding and openness military political activity.
- Keep the status of a non-joining country.

5. According to its Military Doctrine, Ukraine will consider a state consistent policy of which contains military danger for Ukraine, leads to intervention to Ukraine's domestic affairs, encroachment on its territorial integrity and on national interests, to be its political antagonists.

6. Ukraine respects the right to freedom of social political choice of each state and excludes military intervention in its domestic affairs.

7. Attitude of Ukraine to nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction is, firstly, its intention to become a non-nuclear state in future; reduction and destroying nuclear arms allocated on its territory, connected with

adequate actions of other states and providing with reliable guarantees of its security by them and by world community. As to techniques of production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Ukraine is against their spreading.

8. Military security of Ukraine is achieved by means of:

- Ability to carry out military actions on land, sea, in near space and in air.
- Equipment of Military Forces with modern means of armed struggle.

In doing so, Ukraine must be ready to detach appropriate military contingents to UN forces for carrying out military actions to suppress aggressive actions of some states or some groups of states, as well as to support peace and security in different regions, according to the decision of the Security Council. According to the Doctrine, military security of Ukraine may also be ensued by creation of zones, free from weapons of mass destruction, and regional security systems.

9. The main task of the Armed Forces is to defend independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine. The basic principles of construction of Armed Forces are:

- Recruitment on the basis of general military service and by contrasts, with gradual change to professional army.
- Complete departization (ban for military servicemen to participate in activity of political parties and movements).

10. One of the most important principles of Armed Forces in the Doctrine is formulated as follows: 'in balance construction of kinds of Armed Forces and special forces. Priority will be given to highly powerful high-accuracy weapons, means of reconnaissance, airmobile units, air-space defense perspective types of vessels and submarines.

11. Basic principles of military economic policy of Ukraine are:

- Using competitive approach to development and production of new weapons and military equipment.
- Achievement of high ease of manufacture of weapons systems and necessary level of unification of their elements.
- Rational conversion of military productions.

["Tri K" Company - Private Scientific Research Bureau, "Ukraine Today"]

APPENDIX D. ATTITUDE OF UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS TOWARDS THE DOCTRINE

1. Leonid Kuchma:

I do not want Ukraine to become a sort of sanitary border or barrier between East and West.

I do not quite understand non-block status of Ukraine. [*Golos Ukrainy*, 30 November 1994]

2. Mr G. Udovenko, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

We did not rely only on the West. And it is impossible to say that we do not understand the importance of relations with Russia. Now our first and foremost task is normalization of our relations with Russia, improvement and development of ties with CIS countries. I consider our relations with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Baltic states to be of the greatest importance. We did not yet appraise the phenomenon of Far East countries: Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore which developed themselves fast. We did not have the concept of our relations with such countries as Egypt, United Arabian Emirates. Our relations with the United States of America is very important. To put it short the USA should guarantee our nuclear safety. Having declared ourselves the state without nuclear weapons we did not get guarantees of our security. We do not reject to follow this course but where are concrete steps of the USA. [*Golos Ukrainy*, No 176, 1994]

3. Mr Valery Shmarov, Defense Minister of Ukraine:

It was not easy to form Armed Forces of a new state having three separate military districts subordinate to Moscow.

Today first of all it is necessary not to rattle the sabre but to make preventive inspection of peace in surrounding world. This is more suitable for civil and not military people. It is possible that we will even engage diplomats.

Ukraine is a non-block state. That is why we are not going to join either NATO or CIS Military Block. It contradicts our legislation. However our cooperation with the East and West, South and North should develop. We should provide our security by diplomatic means and have negotiations with all the neighbors. With Russia as well as with other CIS-countries we have wide bonds on military and technical supply.

In the nearest future we should zealously use what we already have and modernize it if possible...We cannot presently create the whole spectrum of modern arms but it does not mean that we do not try. I think in ten years we will have out first patterns. [Nezavisimost, 12 October 1994]

APPENDIX E. UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

1. "14 foreign bases are situated on the territory of Ukraine." [*Fortune*, 19 November 1994]
2. Russian Intelligence Service: From the report "Russia-CIS: Does the Position of West Need to be Corrected ?"

The necessity of creation of common defense space within the limits of CIS increases. For Russia this necessity is redoubled by the fact that after disintegration of the USSR many objects essential for normal functioning of 'deterrent system' now are situated outside Russia. [*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No 181, September 1994]

3. Boris Yeltsin has already exhausted all his reserves of concessions to the West and now has to become aggressive not only in home affairs but in foreign as well. Mr Yeltsin indicated it is necessary to pay special attention to preparation of the army to possible local armed conflicts on the borders of Russian Federation, to be ready for deployment of highly mobile units in areas of menace. In principle, mobile units inside the country may have the same task which is stipulated by new military doctrine of Russia. [*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 15 November 1994]
4. Agreements signed by Ukrainian and Russian sides during Moscow Meeting (among them 'On the order of mutual supplies of weapons and military equipment, spare parts....organization of military services and 'On cooperation in the field of creation and exploitation of space rocket and rocket equipment') were considered by many observers to be a step towards military and political union of Russia and Ukraine. Possibility of such estimation was proved by recently published report made by Intelligence Service of Russian Federation. In the report three possible scenarios of development of integrational processes in CIS is given and the following conclusion is made: economic, political and military integration corresponds to the requirements of our time and guarantees stabilization of situation in CIS. [*Nezavisimost*, 30 September 1994]

5. Dr Serguey Pirozhkov, Director of National Institute of Strategic Research on Perspectives of Ukrainian-Russian Relations:

Ukraine cannot expect wide and clearly expressed support of the West if it would have strained relations with Russia. In other words the USA and West European countries will not undertake extreme measures to deter Russian aggression towards Ukraine if such situation will take place.

On the other hand one should mention that Ukraine and Russia have common interests. These interests are: MIC conversion, development of new brunches of industry producing mass consumption goods. Efficient cooperation of both countries in war industry and ecological problems solution is also possible. Unfortunately, no progress except future perspectives can be seen in this field. [*Holos Ukrainy*, 18 November 1994]

APPENDIX F . UKRAINE AND THE CIS

1. Secretary of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers Mr. L. Ivashov:

No republic except Russia has its own military-industrial base for producing finished military equipment and weapons.... creation of the defense union as well as its main part - United Armed Forces - is a long term process. Calculations have shown that it took not less than 2-3 years.....as far as joining of Russia and other republics NATO Partnership for Peace Program is concerned I believe that too much attention is paid to this question. We have other more important problems we should solve. [*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No 90, May 1994]

2. Mr. Andronik Migranian, member of the President's Council, counsellor of 'Reforms' Fund, chief expert of the Committee on CIS affairs in the State Duma of Russian Federation, considers it strange that Russian diplomats dealing with Ukraine use to narrow strategic partnership with Ukraine and see it only as economic cooperation which has nothing in common with strategic partnership itself. We should prevent the attempt of creation of geopolitical pluralism on the territory of the former USSR and try not only in words but in deeds begin to advance multilevel integration, said Mr Migranian. [*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 10 December 1994]

APPENDIX G. TREATY ON ORDINARY ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

1. Leonid Kuchma:

...We should change the essence of our military reforms and create a mobile army not only by means of its mechanical reduction but effectively using the means we get from its reduction... [*Holos Ukrainy*, No. 105, 1994]

2. Leonid Kuchma:

We have the chance to become the first country in the world which is not able to cope with its own industrial and military potential, create ecological danger for other countries.[*Holos Ukrainy*, 13 October 1994]

3. Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe

Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe was signed on November 19, 1990, by the USSR and was ratified without any changes in July 1992 by Ukraine. The treaty terms for Ukraine include, that within a 40 month period, until November 1995, Ukraine should reduce: more than 2,000 tanks, 1,500 armored cars and 550 battle planes. Within 21 months, April 1, 1994, Ukraine has reduced: 721 tanks, 544 armored cars and 174 battle planes. According to the Treaty after November 1995 Ukraine should not exceed the following amount of military equipment: 4,080 tanks, 5,050 armored cars, 4,040 artillery systems with caliber 100mm and more, 1,090 battle planes and 330 battle helicopters. During this period of time Ukraine was inspected by international bodies 141 times. [*Holos Ukrainy*, No 60, April 1994]

4. Mr V. Lemish, Chief of Defense Department in the Cabinet of Ministers:

Our army enters the XXI century with backward technical equipment and weapons and we cannot modernize or at least maintain our weapons in fighting trim because all the parts are delivered by Russia. And the main thing: we have no money. [Kievskie Vedomosti, 9 August 1994]


5. Dr. V. Kulish:

We have intellectual potential enough to reach world's front line in relatively short terms and without great budget expenses. Today we already have some things to the working out of which the USA have not yet started.

In Ukraine one cannot yet see serious intentions for the creation of scientifically grounded and realistic defense conception. [Holos Ukrainy, 26 November 1994]


6. Ukraine has started national military standardization. At the same time it joined CIS agreement on common standardization of weapons and military equipment. [Kommersant Ukrainy, 21 December 1994]

APPENDIX H. SUPREME COMMAND



Supreme Command -- Republic of Ukraine

APPENDIX I. TROOP STRENGTH ('000)



Ukraine's Shrinking Military. Bar Graph.
Financial Times, Friday, March 24, 1995. (Source:
Defence ministry)

APPENDIX J. UKRAINE'S MILITARY BALANCE: 1994-1995 (Figures reflect force levels as of October 1994)

I. TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

- A. **ACTIVE:** 517,000 (excluding Strategic Nuclear Forces and Black Sea Fleet; including 47,000 in central staff and units not covered below).
- B. **RESERVES:** some 1 million with military service within 5 years.

II. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: (ownership and control disputed)

- A. **ICBM:**
SS-19 Stiletto (RS-18): 110 (at two sites)
SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22): 46 (silo-based, one site co-located with SS-19) (said to have been deactivated).
- B. **BOMBERS:** 42: 23 Tu-95H (with AS-15 ALCM), 19 Tu-160 (with AS-15 ALCM) (under Ukrainian command).

III. GROUND FORCES: 308,000

MOD tps: 1 TD (trg), 1 arty div, 1 arty, 1 ATK, 3 engr bde

A. WESTERN OP COMMAND:

- 1. Comd tps: 1 arty div (1 arty, 1 MRL, 1 ATK bde), 1 TD (trg), 1 engr regt.
- 2. 3 Corps: 1 with MRD (1 reserve), 2 mech (1 reserve), 1 arty, 1 engr bde, 1 MRL, 1 ATK regt. 1 with 2 mech div, 1 mech, 1 arty bde, 1 ATK, 1 MRL regt (both reserve). 1 with 1 TD, 1 ATK regt.

B. SOUTHERN OP COMMAND:

- 1. Comd tps: 2 mech div (1 trg), 1 air-mobile div, 1 arty div, 2 arty bde (1 reserve).
- 2. 3 Corps: 1 with 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde, 1 ATK, 1 MRL regt (last 3 reserve). 1 with 1 MRD (reserve), 1 mech div, 1

MRL, 1 ATK (reserve) regt. 1 with 1 TD, 2 mech div, 1 arty bde, 1 ATK, 1 MRL regt.
Other units (subordination not known) 2 SF (Spetsnatz), 7 SSM bde, 8 SAM bde/regt.

C. EQUIPMENT:

MBT: some 5,380 (incl some 1,400 in store): 1,030 T-54/-55, 285 T-62, 2,400 T-64, 1,320 T-72, 345 T-80.

LIGHT TANKS: 50 PT-76.

RECCE: some 2,000, incl 520 BRM.

AIFV: some 3,026: 1,450 BMP-1, 1,450 BMP-2, 6 BMP-3, 120 BMD

APC: some 2,190: 400 BTR-60, 1,300 BTR-70, 450 BTR-80, 40 BTR-D; plus 1,100 MT-LB, 3,000 'look-alikes.'

TOTAL ARTY: 3,638:

TOWED ARTY: 1,050: 122mm: 400 D-30; 152mm: 200 D-20, 175 2A65, 275 2A36.

SP ARTY: 1,304: 122mm: 640 S; 152mm: 500 2S3, 24 2S5, 40 2S19, 203 mm: 100 2S7.

COMBINED GUN/MORTAR: 120mm: 64 2S9.

MRL: 640: 122mm: 375 BM-21, 25 9P138; 132mm: 5 BM-13; 220mm: 140 9P140; 300mm: 95 9A52.

MORTARS: 580: 120mm: 330 2S12, 250 PM-38.

SSM: 132 Scud, 140 Frog/SS-21.

ATGW: AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-6 Spiral.

SAM: SA-4/-6/-8/-11/-12A/-15.

SURV: SNAR-10 (big Fred), Small Fred (arty)

IV. AIR FORCE (incl Air Defense): 146,000; some 993 cbt ac, plus 440 in store (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29), 307 attack hel. 3 air army, 1 PVO army (3 AD regions).

BOMBERS: 2 div HQ, 3 regt (1 trg) with 11 Tu-16, 33 Tu-22, 30 Tu-22M.

FGA/BOMBER: 2 div HQ, 5 regt with 161 Su-24.

FGA: 1 regt with 34 Su-25.

FIGHTER: 2 div (8 regt), 3 PVO div (8 regt) with 145 MiG-23, 79 MiG-25, 172 MiG-29, 59 Su-15, 67 Su-27.

RECCE: 4 regt with 38 Tu-16, 22 Tu-22, 41 Su-17, 36 Su-24, 15 MiG-25.

ECM: 1 regt with 22 Yak-28, 7 Su-24.

TRANSPORT: 174 IL-76, 100 others incl An-12.

TRAINING: 4 centres, 10 regts with 50 Su-24, 475 L-39/L-29.

HELICOPTERS:

ATTACK: 307 Mi-24.

SUPPORT: 58 Mi-6, 132 Mi-8, 20 Mi-26.

SAM: 825: SA-2/-3/-5/-10.

- V. NAVY: E16,000 (incl 7,000 Naval Aviation, 5,000 Coastal Defense) (planned total is probably 40,000).

BASES: Sevastopol, Odessa.

PRINCIPLE SURFACE COMBATANTS: 4: 2 Krivak III PCO, 1 Petya-II FF, 1 Grisha V FF.

OTHER SURFACE SHIPS: 1 Slavutich (Sov Kamchatka) comd vessel, some 40 coastal, inshore and riverine patrol craft, incl Grisha II, Zhuk, Pauk I, Stenka, Muravey and Shemel classes, 1 or 2 all log spt vessels; 2 large Pomornik hovercraft (capacity 3 tkr or 10 APC, 300 tps).

BLACK SEA FLEET: (E48,000) (HQ Sevastopol): since August 1992 the Black Sea Fleet has been controlled de jure, jointly by Russia and Ukraine. In practice, this has been de facto Russian control. Some, mainly minor, units of the Fleet have already been transferee to Ukraine and promised to Georgia.

NAVAL AVIATION: (7,000): 7 regts with 68 MiG-29, 43 Su-17, 44 Su-25, 10 Tu-16, 39 Tu-22M (Tu-16, Tu-22M also listed by Russia in CFE data).

COASTAL DEFENSE TROOPS: (5,000) (listed by both Ukraine and Russia in CFE data).

1 Coast Defense div (Reserve).

2 marine inf regt.

EQUIPMENT:

MBT: 244 T-64.

AIFV: 140 BMP-1, 150 BMD.

APC: 20 BMP-60, 150 BTR-70, 200 BTR-70.

TOWED ARTY: 72 D-30.

SP ARTY: 23 2S1.

COMBINED GUN/MORTAR: 24 2S9.

- VI. FORCES ABROAD:

UN AND PEACEKEEPING:

BOSNIA: (UNPROFOR BH): 580; 1 inf bn, plus 9 civ pol.


CROATIA: (UNPROFOR I): 547; 1 inf bn.

- VII. PARAMILITARY FORCES: 66,000.

NATIONAL GUARD: 23,000 (to be 30,000; former MVD eqpt in service).

BORDER GUARD: (incl Coast Guard): 43,000; about 40 minor units ex-Black Sea Fleet and KGB.

APPENDIX K. NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE IN UKRAINE



UKRAINE: Nuclear Weapons and Other Sites of Proliferation Concern


Carnegie Endowment for World Peace. [Sources: William Potter, *Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States*, 1993; START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 1990; START Treaty MOU, December 5, 1994]

APPENDIX L. WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS IN UKRAINE

TYPE	WEAPON SYSTEMS: 1990 START I MOU/ 1994 START I MOU/ CURRENT	WARHEADS: 1990 START I MOU/ 1994 START I MOU/ CURRENT	LOCATION (# OF WEAPON SYSTEMS: 1990 START I MOU/ 1994 START I MOU/ CURRENT	COMMENTS
UKRAINE	Total 670/730/619	Total 1734 ³⁷ /1664/ 814 ³⁸		
SS-19 ICBM Range: 10,000km Payload: 3600kg Warheads: 6 MIRV	130/104/39 ³⁹	780/624/234	Khmel'nitskiy (90/84/NA) Pervomaysk (40/20/NA)	42 SS-19s may have been removed from their silos. ⁴⁰
SS-24 ICBM Range: 10,000km Payload: 3200kg Warheads: 10 MIRV	46/46/0	460/460/0	Pervomaysk (46/46/0)	Under the terms of the Trilateral Statement, all SS-24s have been deactivated. Some SS-24s may have been removed from their silos. ⁴¹ Warheads are being transferred to Russia.
ALCMs and Gravity Bombs (Total)	494/580/580	494/580/580		Bomber loadings are based on START II counting rules and reflect a current total of 46 strategic bombers. ⁴²
Long-range ALCMs	492/578/578	492/578/578	Uzin (336/350/350) Priluki (156/228/228)	Nineteen Blackjack bombers (carrying up to 12 ALCMs) are at Priluki. Twenty Bear H16 bombers (carrying up to 16 ALCMs) and 5 Bear H6 bombers (carrying up to 6 ALCMs) are based at Uzin. ⁴³ All ALCMs are believed to be in storage at or near bomber bases. All bombers and missiles are being sold back to Russia. ⁴⁴
Gravity bombs and short-range ALCMs	2/2/2	2/2/2	Uzin (2/2/2)	One Bear A and one Bear B in storage at Uzin each may carry one gravity bomb. ⁴⁵
Strategic warheads in storage	NA/NA/NA	NA/NA/app. 150	Likely site is Pervomaysk ⁴⁶	Over 390 SS-19 warheads and 460 SS-24 warheads had been removed from missiles by February 1995, and approximately 700 warheads had been sent to Russia under the terms of the Trilateral Statement. ⁴⁷

Weapons Systems and Warheads in Ukraine

APPENDIX M. MILITARY BUDGET SPENDING AS A % OF GDP



Bar Graph. Financial Times, Friday, 24 March 1995. (Source: IMF & Ukrainian government statistics)

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| 37. | Dr. Joseph Pilat
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| 38. | Harvard University
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| 49. | Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace
Palo Alto, California 94306 | 1 |
| 40. | Library
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6428 | 1 |
| 41. | United States Special Operations Command
ATTN: SOJ3-T
7701 Tampa Point Boulevard
MacDill AFB, Florida 33621-5323 | 1 |
| 42. | Hurlburt Base Library
16SVS/SVRL
ATTN: Susan Whitson
410 Cody Avenue
Hurlburt FLD, Florida 32544-5417 | 1 |
| 43. | USASOC
Directorate of History and Museums
ATTN: AOHS/Dr. Stewart
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5200 | 1 |
| 44. | Tess Miller, J.D.
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Pebble Beach, California 93953 | 1 |
| 45. | Askold Kobasa
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